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In recentyears, the fate offederal statutes has increasingly turned on
the contents of their formal legislative records. The Supreme Court has
shown a new willingness tofind statutes unconstitutionalbecause their legislative records do not support the factualjudgtnents thatjustify congressional
action. In this Article, ProfessorsBryant and Simeone trace the development
of the trend toward increasedjudicialscrutiny of legislativerecordsin recent
Supreme Court rulings on the constitutionalityoffederalstatutes. Th, then
critique the Court's new approach, arguing that it is not only inconsistent

with precedent, but alsofundamentally ill advised, most importantly because
it constitutes a constitutionallysuspect intrusion on congressionalinvestiga-

tive and legislativeprocedures. Finally the authors considerwhether heightenedjudicialreview of the legislativerecords offederal statutes is a defensible
means of preventing Congressfrom oversteppingthe constitutionalbounds of
its authority. Concludingthat this is an inappropriateway to restrain Congress, the authors briefly discuss alternative methods of ensuring that congressionalaction has a legitimate constitutional basis.
INTRODUMTION

InJanuary 2000, the United States Supreme Court invalidated the
provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) authorizing private persons to sue their state employers in federal
court. 1 The Court's opinion in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents relied
heavily on Congress's failure to find explicitly, or to compile a legislative record evidencing, a widespread pattern of age discrimination by
the States. 2 Kimers result and rationale closely parallel the Court's
June 1999 decision in F/orida Prepaid Postseconday Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,3 which struck down the Patent Remedy
Act's provision authorizing private suits against nonconsenting States
in federal court. 4 The Court reasoned that the formal legislative reI
2
sion in
3
4

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000).
I. at 648-50. See infra text accompanying notes 148-61 (discussing the Cour's deciKimel at greater length).
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
Id. at 647-48.
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cord provided inadequate support for Congress's prediction that
states will, as they become more involved in researching marketable
technologies, increasingly deprive patent owners of property rights
5
guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
Kimel and FloridaPrepaidare only the latest in a series of decisions
over the past decade in which the Court has carefully scrutinized the
contents of the formal legislative record in evaluating the constitutionality of federal statutes. These cases reflect an important shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence that the Court itself has not
acknowledged. Specifically, the Court has, in recent years, become

increasingly aggressive in striking down federal statutes because the formal legislative record inadequately supports a factual judgment underlying congressional action.6 This development encompasses
several substantive areas of constitutional law, including cases decided
under the First Amendment,7 the Commerce Clause,8 and Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 This trend has, however, largely
gone unnoticed in the academic literature.' 0
Thus, an important goal of this Article is essentially descriptive.
In Part I, we trace the evolution of the Supreme Court's treatment of
the legislative record by examining many of this decade's landmark
5

Id. at 645-46. See infra text accompanying notes 124-47 (discussing the l7orida Prt-

paid decision at greater length).
6
Infra Part I (discussing recent Supreme Court decisions making new demands of
the legislative record in evaluating federal statutes).
7 E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ("Turner I"); see also infra
Part L.A (discussing the Court's emerging requirement of an adequate formal record in
"intermediate scrutiny" cases decided under the First Amendment).
8 E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), superceded by statute as stated in
United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999); see also infra Part .B (discussing
cases decided under the Commerce Clause).
9 E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also infra Part .C (discussing
cases decided under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
10 Notably, to the extent that some legal commentators have perceived movement
toward heightened scrutiny of the legislative record in one or more of the Court's cases,
they have-in sharp contrast to the present Article-uniformly endorsed it. Eg., Philip P.
Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: CongressionalFindings, ConstitutionalAdjudication, and United
States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. R-v. 695, 697 (1996) (concluding that "the approach
taken in Lopez may be a plausible technique to encourage appropriate congressional procedures and consideration"); Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings andJudicialSignals: A Positive PoliticalReading of United States v. Lopez, 46 CAsE W. REs. L. Rav. 757, 760 (1996)
("[T]he legislative record canon... is a useful suggestion calculated to facilitate the exercise ofjudicial review and improve interbranch communication."); HaroldJ. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of RequiringLegislative Findings,46 CAsE IV. Rrs. L.
Rv. 731, 734 (1996) (endorsing with caution the requirement of adequate legislative findings); Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: "The Illusion of Certainty," 46 HASTnNGS LJ.
1723, 1729 (1995) (concluding that the requirement of adequate legislative findings "rep-

resents a radical change in the law governing the process by which Congress legislates" and
"is not all bad"); cf., e.g., Muriel Morisey Spence, What Congress Knows and Sometimes Doesn't
Know, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 653, 659 (1996) (concluding that "Congress should take increasing care to develop and articulate the factual foundations of its actions").
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cases addressing the boundaries of Congress's authority to legislate.
These decisions impose an unexplained requirement on Congress to
support the factual judgments underlying legislative action with evidence included in the legislative record.

Part H explains why we find the Court's imposition of this new
procedural requirement on Congress to be highly questionable. To
begin, this approach is simply inconsistent with the Court's own precedents. Until recently, the Court did not make the constitutionality of
federal statutes depend on Congress supporting its formal findings
with record evidence, at least outside of the narrow categories of laws
subject to the strictestjudicial scrutiny. The Court's nascent approach

does not explain why this settled doctrine should not continue to hold
sway, but instead simply ignores it. More importantly, the Court's new

emphasis on the record is fundamentally ill advised for reasons apart
from precedent First, Congress is simply not an administrative
agency, and the reasons that justify "on-the-record" review in the administrative context, where it arose, do not apply to the legislative
branch. Second, the Court's imposition of new procedural conditions
on Congress's exercise of its legislative authority raises substantial separation-of-powers questions. Third, the Court's new approach is inconsistent with the realities of congressional fact-finding.
Consequently, the Court's recent rulings threaten to divert scarce congressional time and resources to creating a legislative record that satisfies judicial needs at the expense of legitimate legislative ones.
In Part III, we move from describing and criticizing the Court's
increased attention to the legislative record to considering whether,
notwithstanding our reservations, the need to restrain Congress justifies this important shift. Numerous scholars and, in recent years, a
tentative majority of Supreme Court Justices have expressed concern
that Congress frequently exceeds the constitutional bounds of its authority."' Accordingly, Part HI considers the argument that the
11 Indeed, in the years leading up to the Courts decisions in FloridaPrepaidand Kimd.,
a number of legal scholars expressly advocated-much as the Court's decisions now require-that, to keep Congress within constitutional bounds, the Court should compel Congress to compile an evidentiary record or make formal findings before enacting law-s

potentially threatening federalism values. See infra Part IIA (discting and critiqting this
rationale). For instance, Professor Lessig urged the Court to require that, "when regulating in an area of primarily intrastate economic activity," Congress must clearly state "the
economic effect that it estimates a statute will have on interstate commerce." Lav*Tence

Lessig, TranslatingFederalism-United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. Rxv. 125, 207; see also id.

at 208-13 (advocating other, related legislative-process requirements as ajudicious means
to prevent congressional overreaching). Similarly, Professor Gardbaum suggested that the
Court should subject federal statutes regulating intrastate conduct to "hard look" review"
like that applicable to federal administrative agency action challenged under the Administrative Procedure Act. Stephen Gardbaum, Rahinking ConstitutionalFederalism,74 T-x. L
REv. 795, 826 (1996). More recently, ProfessorJackson has called on the Court to impose
upon Congress "process-based clear evidence/clear statement" requirements whenever it
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Court's recent approach, even if doctrinally problematic, is, nonetheless, a jurisprudentially sound response to overreaching by Congress.
We conclude, however, that such a cure would prove worse than the
targeted disease. We then briefly summarize alternative approaches
to policing the constitutional bounds of Congress's authority, recognizing that a thorough analysis of this issue lies beyond the scope of
the present Article.

I
REcENT CASES

Over the past decade, the Court has, subtly and without explanation, become increasingly willing to strike down federal statutes as unconstitutional because of perceived deficiencies in the formal
legislative record. The trend began to emerge in the first of two decisions addressing a First Amendment challenge to cable broadcasting
regulation. 12 From there, it achieved a tenuous foothold first in the
Commerce Clause' 3 context and then in the Court's jurisprudence
concerning Congress's power to enforce Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 14 Most recently, in FloridaPrepaidand Kimel, the Court
has attached apparently decisive significance to Congress's failure to
compile a record demonstrating that the challenged statutes addressed real problems. Because the Court has not even acknowledged, let alone attempted tojustify, this shift in its jurisprudence, this
Part describes this progression in some detail.
A.

A Tale of Two Turners. The Court's Turner Broadcasting
Decisions

The 1994 and 1997 Turner Broadcasting15 decisions constitute the
modern Court's first foray-outside the context of so-called "strict
scrutiny"-into heightened review of the legislative record underlying
attempts "to regulate private conduct outside of established areas of federal regulation and
not obviously within an enumerated power." See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses
and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111IIHv. L. REV. 2180, 2240 (1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Professor Jackson argued that her approach "would result, in
effect, in a referral back to Congress of legislation when the Court found the connection to
an enumerated power... inadequately established" in the legislative record, id. at 2234
n.238, much as a court might remand a proposed rule to a federal agency if the administrative record were to be held deficient.

12

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ("Turner 1").

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), supercededby statute as stated in United
States v. Dank, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
14 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
15 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) ("Turner I"); Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) ("Turner II"). See generally Comment, Constitutional
Substantial-EvidenceReview? Lessonsfrom the Supreme Court'sTurner Broadcasting Decisions,97
COLUM. L. REv. 1162 (1997) (attempting to clarify the Court's approach in the Turner
decisions); Note, Deference to Legislative FactDeterminationsin FirstAmendment Cases After Turis
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a federal statute. At issue in the Turner cases was the constitutionality
of the "must-carry" provisions of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which required cable television
providers to dedicate a portion of their channels to carrying local
broadcast television stations. 16 To support the must-carry provisions,

Congress wrote into the Act's preamble numerous factual conclusions
and predictive judgments about the broadcast and cable television industries. 17 These judgments followed three years of congressional
hearings on the subject 18
Congress specifically found that "[t] here ha[d] been a substantial
increase in the penetration of cable television systems over the past
decade" and that, because "most cable television subscribers have no
opportunity to select between competing cable systems," cable operators enjoyed "undue market power... as compared to that of consumers and video programmers." 19 Congress concluded further that
"[m]ost subscribers to cable television systems do not or cannot...
receive broadcast television services" unless broadcast channels are
carried via cable. 20 Because "[c]able television systems and broadcast
television stations increasingly compete for television advertising revenues," Congress reasoned, cable systems had a powerful economic incentive to refuse to carry broadcast signals.2 1 Congress concluded
that the combination of broadcasters' needs for access to the viewer
audience serviced by cable systems, the undue market power enjoyed
by cable operators, and cable operators' economic incentives not to
carry broadcast signals, seriously jeopardized the economic viability of
free local broadcast television. 22 Congress enacted the must-carry provisions to protect broadcast television from this threat.
Shortly after the Act became law, numerous cable operators and
programmers filed suit in federal court challenging the must-carry
provisions as violative of the Free Speech and Press Clause of the First
Amendment.23 After a three-judge district court rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional challenge and upheld the Act, - ' the plaintiffs apner Broadcasting, 111 HAv. L REv. 2312 (1998) (describing judicial review of legislative
fact-finding after Turner).
16 TurnerI, 512 U.S. at 626.
17 Id at 632-34.
18 Id at 632.
19 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L No.

102-385, § 2(a) (2), (3), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
20
Id § 2(a) (17), 106 Stat. at 1462.
21 Id. § 2(a)(14), (15), 106 Stat. at 1462.
22 Id. § 2(a)(16), 106 Stat. at 1462.
23 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 634.
24 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 51 (D.D.C. 1993), vacatd,512 U.S.
622 (1994). The Cable Act required that a three-judge district court first hear constitu-

334

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:328

pealed directly to the Supreme Court. Most of Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court in Turner isdevoted to rejecting the threshold
claim that the must-carry provisions were "content based" and thus

subject to the "most exacting" First Amendment scrutiny.25 The Court
ratified the district court's decision to apply the more deferential "intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral restrictions."26 Nevertheless, the Court vacated the district court's decision
granting summary judgment in favor of the government and re27
manded for further development.
In a portion of his opinion representing a four-justice plurality,
Justice Kennedy explained that a remand was necessary because it was
unable to determine whether Congress supported its pertinent factual
findings with sufficient record evidence to satisfy even intermediate
scrutiny.28 The plurality "ha[d] no difficulty concluding" that Congress's asserted interests in preserving "free, over-the-air local broadcast television" and "promoting fair competition" in the television
industry constituted "important governmental interest[s]" for the purposes of intermediate scrutiny when "viewed in the abstract. '29 The
plurality was skeptical, however, of Congress's determination that the
must-carry rules would "in fact advance those interests."30 Justice Kennedy reasoned that Congress could not defend governmental restrictions on speech with "mere[ ] conjectur[e]" that the supposed harms
to be addressed are real and will be substantially alleviated by the challenged restrictions.3 ' Accordingly, the government bore a duty to
convince the Court, exercising its independent judgment, that local
broadcasting was "in need of the protections afforded by the mustcarry regulations" and that, in any event, the regulations did not
tional challenges to the must-carry provisions. § 23, 106 Stat. at 1500 (codified as amended

at 47 U.S.C. § 555(c) (1994)).
25 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 641-61. Both the four-Justice dissent and Judge Williams's
dissent from the decision of the three-judge district court championed that position. See
id. at 677-78 (O'ConnorJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Turner,819 F. Supp,
at 59 (Williams, J., dissenting).
26 Turner I, 512 U.S. at 661-62.
27 Id. at 666-68 (plurality opinion).

28 Id. at 664-68 (plurality opinion) (opinion for Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Kennedy, Blackmun, and Souter). A court applying intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment must uphold a content-neutral speech restriction so long as the regulation is

narrowly tailored to further "'an important or substantial governmental interest... unrelated to the suppression of free expression.'" Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
29 Id. at 662-63. The Court also concluded that "promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a multiplicity of sources" was a similar "important governmental interest" in the abstract. Id.
30

Id. at 664 (plurality opinion).

31

Id. (plurality opinion).
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"'burden substantially more speech than ... necessary.'" 3 2 The plurality concluded that remand was necessary because "[o]n the state of
the record developed thus far," it could neither confirm nor reject
Congress's prediction that the economic viability of local broadcast
television would be threatened absent the Act's must-carry
33
requirements.
The plurality opinion was, however, strangely ambiguous about
whether the inquiry on remand should focus solely on the formal legislative history of the Act or should extend to consideration of any
4
relevant, admissible evidence that the parties subsequently gathered.
At one point, Justice Kennedy implied that the inquiry turned on the
adequacy of the evidence on which Congress had actually relied, stating that the Court had a duty "to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial
evidence."3 5 This characterization of the Court's role suggested that it
should evaluate Congress's judgment by independently assessing only
the evidence that Congress had actually considered, as reflected in the
formal legislative history of the Act. The sole authority Justice Kennedy cited for this proposition was a D.C. Circuit decision reviewing
not an Act of Congress, but rather an agency rule. 3 6
32 Id. at 664-65 (plurality opinion) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989)).
33 Id. at 665 (plurality opinion). The Court cited two prior decisions to support the
proposition that, at least in the First Amendment context, "the deference afforded to legislative findings does not foreclose [the Court's] independentjudgment of te facts bearing
on an issue of constitutional law." Id at 666 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). In both of the prior cases, however, the Court reserved for itself
the final decision on "mixed" questions of (constitutional) law and fact, as opposed to
"pure" questions of fact or predictions as to the likely future course of a complex and
evolving industry. First, in Landmark Communications,Inc. t,. irginia,435 U.S. 829 (1978),
the Court quite sensibly rejected the claim that it must acquiesce in an implicit "factual"
finding by the Virginia legislature that the proscribed speech posed the kind of "clear-andpresent-danger"justifying regulation of protected speech consistent with the First Amendment. Id. at 842-44. In effect, counsel for the Commonwealth boldly argued that the
Court should defer to the legislature's implicit conclusion that the statute uas constitutional. For a discussion of the second decision, Sable Comm unications of California, Inc. V.
FCC 492 U.S. 115 (1989), see infra text accompan)ing notes 263-74.
34 See TurnerI, 512 U.S. at 664-68 (plurality opinion).
35 Id. at 666 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
36
i& at 666 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy relied on Centu O Communications
Corp. v. FCa 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Century Communications, the court struck
down FCC must-carry regulationsthat the Commission promulgated prior to the enactment
of the Cable Television Act of 1992 as an exercise of its general statutory authority to
ensure that the broadcast spectrum advances the "public interest." Id. at 293-94 (citing
Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). In both Centiny
Communicationsand Quincy Cable TV, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged that its power to insist
upon a formal record supporting the factual findings and predictivejudgments underlying
the FCC's content-neutral speech restrictions arose from "the administrative context." Century Communications,835 F.2d at 300 (citing authority for the proposition that "agencies"
are "requir[ed]" to compile a formal record demonstrating the existence of a problem in
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Elsewhere in this portion of his opinion, however, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "Congress is not obligated, when enacting its
statutes, to make a record of the type that an administrative agency or
court does to accommodate judicial review."3 7 Nevertheless, Justice
Kennedy indicated that the Court would require "a more substantial
elaboration in the District Court of the predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the introduction of some additional
evidence" supporting Congress's conclusions in order to uphold the
statute.3 8 With this ambiguous directive, the Court remanded to the
threejudge district court for the development of "a more thorough
'39
factual record.
On remand, the three-judge district court broadly interpreted
Turnerfs mandate to authorize the introduction of evidence not part
of "the record before Congress at the time that it enacted the 1992
Cable Act."40 This included evidence relating to postenactment develorder to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment); Quincy Cable T, 768
F.2d at 1454; see id. at 1455 n.44 (recognizing that the court's role would be different "in
the context of reviewing legislative acts").
37 TurnerI, 512 U.S. at 666 (plurality opinion). The Court also acknowledged its duty
to "accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress" and insisted that
the Court's "obligation to exercise independent judgment when First Amendment rights
are implicated is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress' (s]
factual predictions with our own." Id. at 665-66 (plurality opinion).
s38 1& at 667 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). The tension injustice Kennedy's
plurality opinion was echoed in the concurring opinion ofJustice Blackmun, who wrote
separately "to emphasize the paramount importance of according substantial deference to
the predictive judgments of Congress, particularly where, as here, that legislative body has
compiled an extensive record in the course of reaching its judgment." Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Blackmun explained that "[t]he Government had occasion to submit to the District Court only portions of the record developed by
Congress," and opined that "[the record before the District Court no doubt will benefit
from any additional evidence the Government and the other parties now see fit to present." Id. (Blackmun,J., concurring). Justice Blackmun did not say, however, whether the
inquiry on remand should focus on the sufficiency of the record compiled by Congress
before it acted or the broader question of the economic need for and proper scope of a
must-carry requirement.
39 Id. at 668 (plurality opinion). Only three Justices-the Chief Justice and Justices
Blackmun and Souter-joined section ILI.B of Justice Kennedy's opinion. Justice
O'Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg, would have held the statute
unconstitutional, id. at 685 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and
Justice Stevens would have affirmed the district court's decision without a remand. Id. at
669-70 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Although Justice Stevens agreed that "the question for the reviewing court... is merely whether 'Congress has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence,' given [Justice Kennedy's] caveat that Congress need
not compile or restrict itself to a formal record in the manner required of a judicial or
administrative factfinder," Justice Stevens believed that "application of that standard ...
require[d] affirmance" of the district court's decision. Id. at 670-71 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring in part). Because a vote byJustice Stevens to affirm would have left no majority
support to dispose of the appeal, he decided to concur in the judgment vacating and remanding for further proceedings. Id. at 674 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
40 Turner Broad. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 738 (D.D.C. 1995), affd, 520 U.S. 180
(1997).
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opments in the broadcast and cable television industries.4 1 The three
opinions produced on remand, however, reflected a more subtle, and
fundamental, disagreement over what role the Supreme Court decision had intended the district court to play. After the parties put
"reams of paper" before the court,4-" the more developed record pulled the three district court judges in three different directions. Judge
Sporkin concluded, as he had initially, that the government uas entifled to summaryjudgment; 43 Judge Williams remained convinced that
the statute was unconstitutional;44 andJudgeJackson would have sent
the matter on to trial for even further development of the factual record.45 In the end, Judge Jackson reluctantly agreed to join Judge
Sporkin in granting summary judgment in favor of the government
46
and holding the Act constitutional.
All three judges concluded that the Supreme Court's TurnerIdecision permitted them to consider new evidence on remand. 47 But
they all struggled to understand how evidence outside the record Congress had compiled could be relevant to the question the Supreme
Court had directed them to resolve: whether Congress had drawn reasonable inferences on the basis of the record before it."8 Judge
Sporkin's understanding of the standard of review reflected his awareness of the oddity of considering additional evidence to evaluate the
reasonableness of ajudgment made on a narrower record; he cast the
question as whether there was before the court "substantial e%idence
from which Congress could have drawn a reasonable inference" in support of the Act.4 9 Judge Jackson, who believed that the parties' submissions on remand left the record "intractably ambiguous,"
ultimately decided to uphold the Act by "tak[ing] at face value" the
record before Congress in 1992 and, apparently, by ignoring the ambiguities created by the evidence subsequently presented only to the
court 50 Finally, Judge Williams refused to confine his analysis to the
record compiled by Congress on the theory that it was a one-sided
account "put together under the aegis of the statute's proponents."5 1
Like Judge Sporkin, Judge Williams had some difficulty articulating
the standard of review to be applied to Congress's resolution of disputed facts; he wrote that "we must accord substantial deference to
41
42

4
44
45

46
47

48

49
50
51

Id. at 745-47.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 751-52.
Id. at 789 (Wiflliams, J., dissenting).
Id. at 752 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 738-39; i. at 752 (Jackson,J., concurring); id.at 758 (WilliamsJ., dissenting).
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 739 (emphasis added).
Id. at 752 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 758 (Wflliams.,J., dissenting).

338
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the predictive judgments of Congress, making an independent judg'' 2
ment of the facts but not reweighing the evidence de novo. r Of
course, given the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's Turner I directive,
confusion at the district-court level was to be expected.
On further appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, with a dissent
from the same four Justices who dissented in Turner L.'3 Writing for
the five-Justice majority, Justice Kennedy found that the "expanded
record" 54 assuaged the Court's earlier doubts about Congress's judgments that broadcast television faced a serious threat and that the
must-carry rules constituted a measured response.5 5 With a hint of
retreat, if not apology, Justice Kennedy emphasized the narrowness of
the reviewing court's role: In determining whether Congress's judgments are supported by substantial evidence, "substantiality is to be
measured in this context by a standard more deferential than we accord to judgments of an administrative agency."5 6 Although "the deference [due] to Congress is in one respect akin to deference owed to
administrative agencies because of their expertise," courts "owe Congress' [s] findings an additional measure of deference out of respect

for its authority to exercise the legislative power," for courts ought not
"infringe on traditional legislative authority to make predictive judgments when enacting nationwide regulatory policy. '5 7 Perhaps most
importantly, Justice Kennedy's reliance on materials introduced on remand, including evidence of postenactment developments in the television industry, indicated that a reviewing court should not limit its
inquiry to evidence included in the formal legislative record. 8 Thus,
Turnerffappeared to undercut the Turner Iplurality's suggestion that
the Court may oblige Congress, like an administrative agency, to substantiate its findings that support its decision to regulate with evidence
on the formal record of its proceedings.
Id. at 757 (Williams, J., dissenting).
53 Justice Breyer, who had replaced Justice Blackmun in the interim, voted to affirm.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 225 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part)
("Turner II").
54 Id. at 195.
52

55
56

Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.

Id. at 196.
E.g., id. at 203-06 (plurality opinion); id. at 221. More recently, in City of Erie v.
Pap'sA.M., 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000), a divided Court rejected a First Amendment challenge
to a city ordinance prohibiting nude dancing. In a separate opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, Justice Souter questioned the factual validity of the city's association
of nude dancing with a variety of social ills and chastised the plurality for not remanding to
provide for what he deemed to be necessary development of the evidentiary record in the
lower court. Id. at 1403-06 (SouterJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). By advocating a remand for development of the judicial record, rather than affirming the lower
court decision invalidating the ordinance, Justice Souter implicitly reaffirmed the teaching
of Turner II that a reviewing court should not confine its inquiry to the formal legislative
record.
57
58
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Unfortunately, however, the Turner H dissent more accurately

foreshadowed the future of the Court's review of the legislative record
in constitutional cases. After a brief nonacquiescence in Turner Ts
conclusion that the must-carry rules required only intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment, 59 the dissent undertook to demonstrate in detail that the congressional judgments underlying the mustcarry rules were not supported by substantial evidence.6 0 In this regard, the dissent reflects the critical lesson of the two Turnerdecisions:
the ambiguity in Justice Kennedy's opinions regarding the significance of the formal legislative record represents, as has become clear
in retrospect, the slipping of the camel's nose into Congress's tent.61
B. From Free Speech to the Commerce Clause: Lopez and
Morrison
Between the Supreme Court's two Turner decisions, the Court
held in United States v. Lopez6 2 that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
6 Al1990 exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.A
though Lopez may be the single most-discussed decision of the last decade, 64 its significance for our purposes is confined to the limited, but
nonetheless fundamental, observation that the Lopez decision began
to extend the high demands of the formal legislative record suggested

by Turner I to the Court's revived Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
Lope's central issue was whether Congress had power under the
Commerce Clause to impose a criminal prohibition on the possession
of a firearm within 1000 feet of a school. 65 The Lopez Court did not
question that Congress had that power if possession of a firearm
TurnerHi,520 U.S. at 230-35 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 235-44 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Cf Frank B. Cross, RealismAboutFederalism,74 N.Y.U. L RE%,. 1304, 1326-27 (1999)
(noting that, with respect to recent federalism decisions, "broad, process-oriented proposals could have disastrous separation of powers consequences, as they invite the camel's
nose ofjudicial review into the tent of legislative deliberation").
62
514 U.S. 549 (1995), superceded by statuteas stated in United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d
1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
63 1d. at 551. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
64 See, eg., Cross, supranote 61, at 1322 (arguing that "Lopagarnered much attention
but seems unlikely to have much impact on the exercise of federal power" (citation omitted)); DeborahJones Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MicH. L REv. 674 (1995) (exploring the new
Commerce Clause jurisprudence); H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic &arch for aJudi.
dally EnforceableFederalism, 83 Mn'N. L REv. 849, 896 (1999) (describing Loprz as merely a
"minor obstade" to Congress); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi
Sands -ower-Loving Ry, 97 Mic. L RE,. 174, 176 (1998) (noting that "[w]hether Lopez
marks a dramatic shift in Commerce Clause jurisprudence or is instead destined to be a
'but see' citation remains to be seen"); Joan Biskupic, CourtSignals Sharp Shift on CongressionalPowes, WAsH. PosT, Apr. 28, 1995, at A3 (discussing Lopef's implications).
65 514 U.S. at 551.
59

60
61
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within a school zone had a sufficiently substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Instead, the Court's discussion of this issue focused substantially on Congress's failure to make explicit factual findings or
compile record evidence demonstrating such a connection.66
Before examining the Supreme Court's decision, however, a brief
examination of the Fifth Circuit's Lopez6 7 opinion provides helpful
background for understanding the Supreme Court's treatment of the
Gun-Free School Zone Act's legislative history. Most significantly, the
Fifth Circuit held that the Act was unconstitutional solely because Congress had not expressly found, in either the text of the statute or the
formal legislative history of the Act, that possession of guns in and
around schools has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 63 The
Fifth Circuit expressly stated that this lack of findings, or legislative
history in lieu thereof, was fatal and that the result might have been
different had Congress compiled a sufficient legislative record.6 9 The
court explained that the requirement of findings, in either the text or
legislative history of a statute, served to compel Members of Congress
"to fairly and consciously fix, rather than to simply disregard, the Constitution's boundary line between the 'completely internal commerce
of a state ... reserved for the state itself' and the power to regulate
'Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States."' 70 In
other words, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the courts could, by requiring explicit findings, compel Congress to deliberate before enact-

ing statutes that stretch the outer boundaries of the Commerce Clause
power. Moreover, unlike the Supreme Court in Turner I, the Fifth
Circuit in Lopez concluded that a remand was unnecessary. 7 1 The
court reasoned that supplying "evidence in court of the same general
kind that might have been presented to a Congressional committee or
the like concerning any relationship between the legislation and interstate commerce" would still require the court to "guess at what Congress's determination would have been" had it considered the same
evidence. 72 Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Gun-Free
Id. at 562-63.
United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), af'd, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
68 Id. at 1367-68.
69 Id. at 1363, 1367-68 ("Where Congress has made findings, formal or informal, that
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce, the courts must defer 'if there
is any rational basis for' the finding.... Practically speaking, such findings almost always
end the matter." (citations omitted)). Although the Fifth Circuit was clearly troubled by
the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Perez v. United States that "'Congress need (not]
make particularized findings in order to legislate,'" the court dismissed that well-established rule on the ground that "[n]o citation of authority is given." Id. at 1362 n.41 (quoting Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971)).
70 Id. at 1363 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824), and U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
71 Id. at 1368.
72 Id. at 1364 n.44 (emphasis added).
66

67
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School Zones Act was unconstitutional because Congress had not compiled the kind of legislative record "necessary to locate [the Act]
73
within the Commerce Clause."
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion affirming the Fifth Circuit placed somewhat less emphasis on the lack of legislative findings,
but only hinted that Congress might have avoided the Act's invalidation had it made appropriate findings supported by evidence in the
legislative record. The Court reaffirmed that "Congress nornally is not
required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an
activity has on interstate commerce." 74 It added, however, that "to the
extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was visible
to the naked eye, they are lacking here."75
In his dissentJustice Souter aptly summarized the Court's ambiguous position on the relevance of factual findings: He observed that
the Fifth Circuit believed that appropriate findings could have saved
the Act, and that the majority "does not repudiate that position." 76
Moreover, Justice Souter recognized the significance of the Fifth Circuit's, and perhaps the majority's, understanding of the role that legislative findings play in constitutional adjudication. He reminded the
Court that its precedents did not require Congress to make explicit
findings as a predicate to legislating because a law's enactment generally implies that Congress believes conditions exist to support its exercise of an enumerated power. 77 Justice Souter emphasized that the
proper question for the Court was "whether the legislative judgment is
73

74

Id. at 1368.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (emphasis added), superceded by

statute as stated in United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999).

75 Id. at 563. After the Fifth Circuit held the Act unconstitutional, but before the
matter was resolved by the Supreme Court, Congress enacted a law stating that:
the occurrence of violent crime in school zones has resulted in a decline in
the quality of education in our country
...this decline... has an adverse impact on interstate commerce and
the foreign commerce of the United States;
...Congress has power, under ieinterstate commerce clause and
other provisions of the Constitution, to enact measures to ensure the integ.
rity and safety of the Nation's schools by enactment of this subsection.

Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-322, § 320904,
108 Stat. 1796, 2125 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1)-(4) (1994)). The Lop=
majority dismissed these subsequent findings in a footnote, observing that the "Government does not rely upon these... findings as a substitute for the absence of findings in the
first instance." 514 U.S. at 563 n.4. But see id.
at 612 n.2 (SouterJ., dissenting) (obsering
that there is "no reason not to consider Congress's findings, insofar as they might be helpful in reviewing the challenge to this statute, even though adopted in later legislation").
76
Lope; 514 U.S. at 612 (SouterJ., dissenting).
77 Id. at 613 (Souter,J., dissenting).
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within the realm of reason," and not whether Congress's judgment
78
was correct.
From these established premises, Justice Souter concluded that if
the Court "were to make the existence of explicit congressional findings dispositive in... difficult cases something other than rationality
review would be afoot. ' 79 Obligating Congress to explain "its policy
choices on the merits would imply either ajudicial authority to review
the justification... of those choices, or authority to require Congress
to act with some high degree of deliberateness, of which express findings would be evidence."8 0 Justice Souter believed, however, that the
Court could claim authority for neither role, as "review for congressional wisdom would just be the old judicial pretension discredited
and abandoned in 1937, and review for deliberateness would be as
patently unconstitutional as an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court."8 1 Because "[s]uch a legislative process requirement would function merely as an excuse for covert review of the
merits of legislation under standards never expressed and more or less
arbitrarily applied," Justice Souter feared that "[u] nder such a regime
'' 2
... the rationality standard of review would be a thing of the past."
In sum, as Justice Souter's dissent acknowledges, the Court's Lopez decision, unlike the Fifth Circuit's, did not go so far as to expressly
require congressional findings sufficient to "locate" federal legislation
within the Commerce Clause. Rather, like the Turner cases, the Lopez
majority was simply ambiguous on this point.8 3
The Court's recent decision in United States v. Morrison,8 4 decided
in May 2000, passed over an important opportunity to clarify this ambiguity. In Morrison, the Court invalidated the civil suit provision of
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). 8 5 The civil suit
provision authorized any person injured by "a crime of violence moti78

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

79

80

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 613-14 (Souter, J., dissenting).

81

Id. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting).

82
83

Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).

85

42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994).

Other commentators have noted the ambiguity of the majority opinion in Lopez on
this point. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 10, at 707; Friedman, supra note 10, at 762; Krent,
supra note 10, at 732; Sara E. Kropf, The Failureof United States v. Lopez: Analyzing the
Violence Against Women Act, 8 S. CAL. Rrv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 373, 398 (1999). See generally
Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New judicialActivism in Theory and Practice, 83
MARQ. L. REv. 435 (1999) (evaluating the new Commerce Clausejurisprudence). For constitutional defenses of VAWA, see SenatorJoseph P, Biden,Jr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: A Defense, 37 HARv.J. ON LEGIs. 1 (2000), andJulie Goldscheid,
United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A Civil
Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism,86 CORNELL L. Rzv. 109 (2000).
84 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
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vated by gender" 6t to bring a suit for compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive or declaratory reliefn 7 in federal district
court s8 The Court invalidated the provision on the grounds that
neither the Commerce Clause nor Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided Congress with the power to authorize the civil
remedy for gender-motivated violence.8 9
Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act struck down in Lopez
VAWA was supported by "a mountain of data assembled by Congress,"
which was all part of the formal legislative record, "showing the effects
of violence against women on interstate commerce." 90 Moreover, the
Conference Committee Report on VAWA contained express, detailed
findings, including the determination that
crimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse
effect on interstate commerce, by deterring potential victims from
traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in
interstate commerce... by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing the supply of and
the demand for interstate products. 9 1
These specific congressional findings, and the extensive use of supportive evidence in the legislative record, clearly distinguished Monison from Loper, thus providing the Court the opportunity to clarify the
role that the absence of such findings had played in Lopez. The Court
did not find it necessary to address that issue, however, despite the
fact that the legislative record's adequacy was hotly disputed by the
parties. 92 Instead, the Court ruled that even if Congress's findings
proved beyond question that intrastate domestic violence has, in the
aggregate, a substantial impact on interstate commerce, the civil remedy provision of VAWA could not be upheld as a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.93 Specifically, the
majority held that the aggregate effect of individual instances of intra86
87
88
89
90

91

I& § 13981(b).
Id- § 13981(c).
Id- § 13981(e) (3).
Mforrisor, 120 S. CL at 1759.
Id- at 1760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994), r'pintd in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 1839,

1853.
92 Indeed, these issues dominated the briefing and the argument in Monison. Eg.,
Brief of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 26-31, Mornison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Brief for the
United States at 21-27, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Brief for Respondent AntonioJ. Morrison at 23-28, Monison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Brief of RespondentJames LaDale Crawford at 2526, Monison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Oral Argument, Morrison (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), available at
2000 WL 41232.
93 Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754 (rejecting "the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic... conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce").
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state, noneconomic activity could not overcome the Court's newly ar-

ticulated requirement that an "activity [must be] economic in nature"

04
in order to be subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause.
This conclusion rendered Congress's findings linking gender-based violence to interstate commerce, and the extensive supportive evidence
it had compiled, legally irrelevant.
The Morrison Court thus furthered Lopez's ambiguity regarding
the need for findings and record evidence in close Commerce Clause
cases. In fact, in describing the importance of Lopez, the Morrisonmajority emphasized that the result in that case had turned in part on the
absence of legislative findings and record evidence. 95 Accordingly,
the implication of Lopez and Morrison, taken together, is that findings
and record evidence, while necessary vis-A-vis the constitutionality of a
congressional statute in a close case, are not alone sufficient. 06
Significantly, the Court's decisions in a third area of constitutional law, Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, confirm this reading of the Commerce
Clause decisions. Indeed, as discussed directly below, the Court's decisions striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 9 7 the
Patent Remedy Act,98 and the state-suit provision of the ADEA, 99 not
only extend this approach to the Fourteenth Amendment context, but
also substantiate Justice Souter's fears that "something other than ra10 0
tionality review [is] afoot."
94 Id. at 1751 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating the
effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature."). Justice Souter noted that
[For the majority... some particular subjects arguably within the commerce power can be identified in advance as excluded, on the basis of characteristics other than their commercial effects. Such exclusions come into
sight when the activity regulated is not itself commercial or when the States
have traditionally addressed it in the exercise of the general police power,
conferred under the state constitutions but never extended to Congress
under the Constitution of the Nation.
Id. at 1765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 1751.
96 Id. at 1752 ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to
sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation."). In rejecting the Solicitor
General's alternative claim that the Court could uphold the civil remedy provision of
VAWA as a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the
majority opinion in Morrison even more clearly reaffirmed the requirement that contestable assertions of congressional authority be backed by unimpeachable findings and record
evidence. See infra note 161.
97 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
98 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627

(1999).

99

Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).

100 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613 (1995) (SouterJ., dissenting), supercaded
by statute as stated in United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999).
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C. Flores: From the Commerce Clause to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment
In City of Boerne v. Rores,1° 1 the Supreme Court invalidated the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as beyond Congress's en2
forcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.10
As RFRA's title suggests, Congress intended the Act to restore the

practice of applying the strictest judicial scrutiny to laws of general
applicability with the incidental effect of imposing a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion.10 3 The Supreme Court's 1990
decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith'0 4 had found this practice to be unnecessary under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 105
Insofar as RFRA applied to state and local law, Congress expressly
invoked its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendments 0 6
and RFRA defenders in the Supreme Court articulated two quite distinct (indeed, potentially incompatible) theories to justify upholding
the statute.' 0 7 First, RFRA could be upheld as Congress's construction
of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which the Supreme Court had long since held to be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0 8 Although this reading conflicted with that of
101

521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Id. at 536. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 5 states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. § 5. RFRA's defenders argued
that the Act "enforce[d]" Section l's guarantees of " 'the equal protection of the laws'" and
"'due process of law,'" to the extent that the latter phrase had been interpreted to incorporate the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Sce Forrs 521 U.S. at 517, 519 (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5).
Other commentators have addressed this topic in depth. Eg.. Kent Greenawalt, WTy
Now Is Not the Timefor ConstitutionaiAmendment; The LimitedRead of City of Boerne v. Flores,
39 Wm.& M1%RY L Rv. 689 (1998) (arguing against an amendment to protect religious
liberties); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Sedion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IN'D. L REv. 163 (1998) (arguing for limitations on
Congress's legislative authority under Section 5); Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch
Theory of the FourteenthAmendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Ofiginal Understandingof
Section5, 109 YALz IJ.115 (1999) (arguing for more deference to congressional legislation
102

passed pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment).

103 Seerores, 521 U.S. at 513-15.
104 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superceded &ystatute as stated in Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F.
Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
105 See Bores,521 U.S. at 512-16 (discussing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of
Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and the preamble to RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) to
(b)).
106

See id. at 516.

107

See id.at 517, 529.

108

See id.at 517.
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the Smith majority,1° 9 RFRA's supporters argued that it was certainly
plausible as an initial matter. 110 Alternatively, RFRA's proponents argued that even if Congress's Section 5 enforcement power does not
extend so far as to allow such a constitutional difference of opinion
between Congress and the Court, RFRA nevertheless could be upheld
as a prophylactic rule designed to enforce the Free Exercise Clause as
the Court construed it in Smith."' On this theory, by requiring
heightened judicial review of all laws that have the effect of substantially burdening religious practice, RFRA would increase the likelihood of courts identifying and striking down those facially neutral
laws enacted for the purpose of discouraging or prohibiting disfavored religious exercise." 2 The rationale for such a prophylactic rule
would be that at least some facially neutral laws may mask a hidden,
unconstitutional intent to discriminate against religious practices." 5
In rejecting this second rationale, the Court relied in part on perceived gaps in the legislative record. The Court found "instructive"
the contrast between "RFRA's legislative record" and "the record
which confronted Congress and the Judiciary in the voting rights
cases."" 4 The comparison was inevitable. In claiming that the Court
could uphold RFRA as a prophylactic rule consistent with the Smith
decision, RFRA's defenders appealed to the wide latitude that the
Court had previously given Congress's exercise of its Fourteenth and
Smith, 494 U.S. at 876-90.
110 See F"ores, 521 U.S. at 517; see alsoBrief of Respondent Flores at 43-45, Flares (No. 952074); Brief for the United States at 39, Fores (No. 95-2074). Commentators have made
thoughtful rejoinders to the Court's dismissal of the first, substantive theory presented by
the RFRA defenders-that Section 5 gave to Congress a role in determining the meaning of
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Michael W. McConnell,
Institutions and Interpretation:A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 Htv. L. REv. 153
(1997); see also, e.g., David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and
CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 31, 34 (arguing that "[a]
proper recognition of the relationship between constitutional interpretation and institutional roles would afford Congress far more deference than the Court gave it in Floreswhen
Congress extends statutory protection to liberty under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"). But seeJay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties with the FirstAmendment: Congress, Section 5, and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1633 (1995) (stating that "[1]n
RFRA Congress has simply willed itself power it cannot possess").
"I
SeeFores,521 U.S. at 529.
112 See id.
113
See id. at 517; see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S,
520, 534 (1993) ("The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which
is masked as well as overt."), supercededby statute as stated in Diaz v. Collins, 872 F. Supp. 353
(E.D. Tex. 1994); Brief of Respondent Flores at 9, Fores (No. 95-2074) (noting that "a
jurisdiction's laws may discriminate against religion in ... forbidden ways without there
having been conscious governmental hostility to religion"); Brief for the United States at
24-25, Fores (No. 95-2074) (stating that RFRA protects "against religious discrimination,
whether veiled behind generally applicable laws or resulting from disparate legislative accommodations, that might otherwise go undetected").
114 Fores, 521 U.S. at 530.
109
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Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers in the voting rights context." 5 For example, RFRA's defenders noted that in 1966 the Court
had found that Congress could exercise its enforcement power to prohibit state-imposed literacy tests," 6 notwithstanding the Court's decision a mere seven years before, holding that the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments did not bar such tests.117 The Flores Court distinguished this and other voting rights cases based in part on a perceived paucity of evidence of intentional discrimination in RFRA's
formal legislative record: "In contrast to the record which confronted
Congress and the Judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable
laws passed because of religious bigotry." 18 The Court discounted
the testimony that congressional committees heard in support of
RFRA as being "anecdotal evidence" inadequate to support Congress's
implicit finding of a "widespread pattern of religious discrimination in
this country." 1 9
As in the Turner and Lopez decisions, however, the F/ores Court
assiduously preserved ambiguity as to the ultimate significance or necessity of legislative findings of fact and supportive legislative record
evidence. Although the Court found the contrast between the legislative records in the voting rights cases and those in the RFRA "instructive," it hastened to add that "[this lack of support in the legislative
record, however, [was] not RFRA's most serious shortcoming." 20° The
115 Brief of Respondent Bores at 11-13, Tora (No. 95-2074); Brief for the United
States at 9-11, Rores (No. 95-2074).
116 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646 (1966), abrogation reaognied by Varner
v. II. Stat. Univ., 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
308 (1966); see also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (holding that Congress has
power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to enforce a prohibition against
state literacy tests), supercededby constitutionalamendment as stated in Nat'l Treasury Employ.
ees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
117 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); see Brief of
Respondent Flores at 11-12, /ores (No. 95-2074).
118 F/ores, 521 U.S. at 530. Commentators have questioned the force ofJustice Kennedy's effort to distinguish the voting rights cases. Eg, Mi
.LS. Gm
a,
REAL FEDo. xu
ISM: WHY IT MfATrERs, How IT CouLD HAPPEN 35-37 & n.37 (1999)

(concluding that,

because the "pre-Rores case law teaches that judges should refrain from second-guessing
congressional responses to perceived problems of discrimination,"Justice Kennedy's reliance on any gaps in RFRA's legislative record, relative to the record that undergirded the
Voting Rights Act, "may be the Rores majority's most questionable argument"). For a discussion of the Voting Rights Act cases, see infra Part II.A.2.
119
/ores, 521 U.S. at 531. Although three justices dissented from the Court's disposition in Bores, all three did so because of their nonacquiescence to the majority's reliance
upon Smith. Id. at 544-45 (O'ConnorJ, dissenting); id. at 565 (SouterJ., dissenting); id.
at 566 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Professor McConnell has observed the similarity between
the Court's treatment of the formal legislative record in /ores and Lop= and has questioned, but offered no solution, why none of the Lopa dissenters also dissented from the
Bores majority's Section 5 analysis. McConnell, supranote 110, at 166.
120 Bores, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
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Court reaffirmed that "[a] s a general matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by which it will reach a decision.' 2 ' The Court
concluded that "[riegardless of the state of the legislative record,"
RFRA would have failed constitutional muster because the Act was
neither "remedial" nor "preventive" but rather was an impermissible
"attempt [to enact] a substantive change in [the] constitutional protections" of the Free Exercise Clause as construed by Smith.122 In essence, then, the R/ores Court rejected as a ruse the claim that RFRA was
merely a prophylactic rule designed to enforce Smith's interpretation
of the Free Exercise Clause, 123 and, as a result, the Court's disparagement of the legislative record was not dispositive. Thus, while Flores
provided the Court a further opportunity to question the adequacy of
Congress's evidentiary record compiled in support of its federal statute, the case did not resolve whether heightened scrutiny of the legislative record constituted an exception to the well-established rule of
deference, or whether it was part of a grander assertion of judicial
power to require record evidence in support of Congress's constitutionaljudgments. Two cases decided within the last eighteen months
reveal that the latter characterization is more accurate.

D. Flor'daPrepaidand Kimel Treating Congress Like an
Administrative Agency
In FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,124 the Court addressed the constitutional validity of a
congressional effort to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Specifically, the Court considered whether Congress's atId. at 531-32.
Id. at 532. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that by striking down
RFRA and preserving the Smith rule as a matter of practice as well as constitutional theory,
the Court allowed "the people, through their elected representatives," rather than the federal judiciary, to balance the individual's religious liberty against conflicting community
policy. Id. at 544 (Scalia, J., concurring). Arguably, however, in striking down RFRA, the
Supreme Court placed its own perceptions about the relative pervasiveness and seriousness
of religious discrimination in this country over those of "the elected representatives of the
people" serving in the United States Congress. See McConnell, supra note 110, at 168.
Likewise, members of the Court could have argued in South Carolinav. Katzenbaeh,
123
383 U.S. 301 (1966), that the congressional prohibition on literacy tests, defended as an
exercise of Congress's Section 2 enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment, was
instead an attempt by Congress to reverse the Court's prior decision that literacy tests were
permissible under the Constitution. There, however, the Court deferred to the claim that
it could uphold the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as a remedial measure. Id. at 333; see GtvE,
supra note 118, at 35 (observing that under the pre-F/ores, Section 5 case law, RFRA "appear[ed] plainly constitutional"). For a discussion of the Voting Rights Act cases see infra
Part II.A.2.
124 527 U.S. 627 (1999). The Court's decision in FloridaPrepaid,although recent, has
already generated some scholarly commentary. E.g., John Randolph Prince, Forgettingthe
Lyrics and Changing the Tune: The Eleventh Amendment and Textual Infidelity, 104 DicE. L. Rw.
1, 85 (1999) (discussing and criticizing FloridaPrepaid).
121
122

2001]

REMANDING TO CONGRESS

349

tempt to empower federal courts to entertain patent-enforcement
actions against States could be justified as an exercise of Congress's
Section 5 power to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.'2
Employing the framework it had announced in R/ores, the Court
inquired whether Congress had "identif[ied] conduct transgressing
the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions" and had "tailor[ed] its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such conduct." 26 Significantly, however, FloridaPrepaidcontinued where Fores
had stopped, indicating dearly that the answer to these questions
would turn on whether the Court was satisfied with the evidence that
Congress had compiled in the statute's legislative history. 27
The Court began its analysis by conceding that a state's intentional infringement of a patent without providing an adequate state
process for redress would constitute a deprivation of "property without due process of law" within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 128 Nevertheless, the Court struck down the state-suit provision
because the underlying legislative record failed to document a sufficient "history of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights.""u 29 The Court stressed that to violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state had to both infringe a
patent and deny the owner an adequate state-law remedy.130 As to the
125 Given the Constitution's express grant to Congress of authority to regulate patents,
see U.S. CoST. art. I, § 8, d. 8, the question raised in Hodda Prepaid would have been
entirely academic four years ago. The Court's decision in Strnindle Tribe ofFloridav. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996), however, "makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers." HordaPre-paid,527 U.S. at 636. Congress may do so, however, when enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 637 (citing

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59). Thus, the Seminole Tribe decision renders dispositive the

question presented in RoridaPrepaid-whether the provision allowing a federal court remedy in cases of patent infringement by the States constituted remedial or preventive (i.e.,
"appropriate") legislation enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id.
126 KoridaPrepaid, 527 U.S. at 639.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 636-37.
129 Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997)).
130 Id. at 643. In a footnote, the Court dismissed the argument that the state-suit provision could be justified as enforcing the patent holder's rights under the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 642 n.7. The Court found dispositive that, while Congress
had explicitly invoked its authority to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the legislative record contained no express invocation of the Takings Clause.
I. The Takings Clause was, however, among the first provisions of the Bill of Rights "incorporated" into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Se Chi. Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). Thus, according to the
oidaPrepaidmajority, even though Congress had expressed its intent to enforce the Due
Process Clause, the Patent Remedy Act failed constitutional muster in part because its legislative history did not document Congress's intent to enforce that Clause as the Court had
interpreted it for over one hundred years. But see EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44
n.18 (1983) (stating that the "constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise." (quotinglWoods v. Cloyd I.
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first of these requirements, the Court observed that "Congress identi-

fied no pattern of patent infringement by the States" and that "Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on the part of
the States.' 31 The instances of state patent infringement that Congress-and the lower courts-had identified were insufficient because
they did not demonstrate a "massive or widespread violation of patent
laws by the States" such as would constitute "evidence that unremedied patent infringement by States had become a problem of national

import."' 32 The Court dismissed as "speculative" congressional hear-

ing testimony that the incidence of state patent infringement is likely
to increase significantly because state-owned research universities are
becoming increasingly involved in the development of marketable
technologies. 33 The Court concluded that the Act's legislative record
lacked sufficient evidence of present or anticipated state patent infringement to substantiate Congress's invocation of its Section 5 en4
forcement power.' 3
As to the second element of a Due Process Clause violation, that
state-law remedies for state patent infringement must be inadequate,
the Court likewise concluded that the legislative record was deficient.
The Court found that "Congress [had] barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent infringement,"' 35 and noted that "Congress itself said nothing about the existence or adequacy of state
remedies in the statute or in the Senate Report."'136 The Court was
unmoved by what it termed the "limited amount" of testimony taken
at congressional hearings suggesting that efforts by patent holders to
employ state-law causes of action, such as deceit or restitution, would
probably fail or, at best, provide incomplete relief.' 37 Similarly, the
Court found insufficient the House Report's finding that the "'availability of a State remedy is tenuous and could vary significantly [from]
State to State."'" 38 According to the Court, "[t] he primary point made
by [the hearing] witnesses... was not that state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather that they were less convenient than
federal remedies, and might undermine the uniformity of patent
Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948))), superceded by statute as stated in McCann v. City of
Chicago, 968 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1992).
131 Koida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 640.
132
Id. at 641 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
Id.; see also id. at 656-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing numerous patent cases involving state universities).
134
Id. at 647.
135
Id. at 643.
136
Id. at 644.
137 Id. at 643-44 & n.8.
138 Id. at 644 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-960, pt. 1, at 37 n.158 (1990)).
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law."' 8 9 As the dissent pointed out, however, the majority's insistence
that the record compiled by Congress did not convincingly show that
state-court remedies were inadequate seems particularly misplaced in
the patent context: "Congress had long ago pre-empted state jurisdiction over patent infringement cases, it was surely reasonable for Con14
gress to assume that such remedies simply did not exist." 0
Significantly, unlike the Flores decision, FloridaPrepaid does not
lend itself to a narrow, fact-specific interpretation. Although the Flores
majority relied in part on perceived gaps in the legislative record, the
Court's holding rested primarily on its view that the RFRA represented an attempt to change the content of, rather than enforce, the
Fourteenth Amendment-essentially an act of nonacquiescence in a
Supreme Court decision. 14 ' The Patent Remedy Act could not be so
easily dismissed. Indeed, whereas "Congress enacted RFRA in direct

response to the Court's decision in" Smith,14 2 Congress had enacted
the Patent Remedy Act before the Court held in Seminole Tribe that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.14 Accordingly, while Flores could have been limited to

circumstances in which Congress attempts to exercise its Section 5
power to alter, rather than enforce, the Constitution, FloridaPrepaid
indicates that the Court will make the same searching demands of the
legislative record whenever Congress invokes this power.

Thus, in FloridaPrepaid,the Court struck down a federal statute
solely because it found the legislative record supporting the Act incomplete.' 4 The Court did so despite three factors distinguishing the

Act from RFRA. (1) the statute at issue was predicated on plausible
assumptions about the present extent of an evil manifested by the very

complaint before the Court;14 (2) record evidence existed to support
Congress's conclusion that the extent of the targeted evil was likely to
139 -7d.By recharacterizing Congress's interest in ensuring that states fully compensate
patent holders as merely an Article I interest in creating one nationwide sstem for resohing patent disputes, the Court avoided Congress's inconvenient finding-supported by
hearing testimony-that state-law remedies do not reliably protect patent holders from
state infringement.
140 Id. at 658 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) ("[RFRA] attempt[s] a sub-

stantive change in constitutional protections."); see also orida Prepaid 527 U.S. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In RFRA Congress sought to overrule this Court's interpretation of
the First Amendment."); Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism and the ADA: State Sovereign
Immunity from PrivateDamage Suits After Boerne, 24 N.Y.U. REx. L & Soc. CM.NGE 481, 542

(1998) (noting ambiguity as to how extensively Roras limits Congress's Power under Section 5).
142

143
144
145

_F/ores, 521 U.S. at 512.
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
I/orida Prepaid,527 U.S. at 640, 647.
at 656-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id.at 63940; id.
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increase in the near future; 14 6 and (3) the Act could not be characterized as the product of congressional resistance to a Supreme Court
decision.' 47 In short, the Florida Prepaid Court boldly asserted the
power to require Congress to articulate and support with evidence in
the formal legislative record its factual conclusions and predictive
judgments underlying a constitutionally controversial statute.
The Court's even more recent decision in Kimel v. FloridaBoard of
Regents,148 decided onJanuary 11, 2000, went out of its way to reaffirm
FloridaPrepaid's teaching that Congress is obligated to make formal
findings of fact supported by substantial legislative-record evidence
when it acts at (what the Court perceives to be) the margins of its
constitutional authority. 49 Like FloridaPrepaid,Kimel concerned the
constitutional validity of an attempt by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. Following the example of
FloridaPrepaid,the Court in Kimel struck down the state-suit provision
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), holding that it
violated the Eleventh Amendment. 50 Justice O'Connor's opinion for
the Court acknowledged that EEOC v. Wyoming' 51 had upheld the extension of the ADEA's provisions to state employers as a valid exercise
of Congress's Commerce Clause power. 152 Applying the analytical
framework set forth in FloridaPrepaid,however, Justice O'Connor reasoned that Congress's correlative effort to abrogate state sovereign immunity would be upheld only if applying the ADEA to the states lies
within Congress's power to enforce the substantive guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 5 3
Intervening in defense of the challenged provision, the federal
government argued that the Act could be upheld on the ground that
it remedied or prevented discrimination by states on the basis of age
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause.' 5 4 The Court rejected this argument, noting first that under
its prior holdings state discrimination on the basis of age was constitutionally permissible so long as it could be said to be "rationally related
to a legitimate state interest."155 On this basis, the Court concluded
that very little of the state conduct prohibited by the ADEA would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment and thus that "the ADEA '[was] so
146

147
148
149

150
151

Id. at 656-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
Id at 645.
Id. at 650.
460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983), superceded by statute as stated in McCann v. City of Chicago,

968 F.2d 635 (7th Cir. 1992).
152 Kime, 120 S.Ct. at 643.
153 Id. at 644.
154 Id. at 647-48.
155 Id. at 646.
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out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconcannot be understood as
56
stitutional behavior."
Although the Court might have ended its analysis there, it did
not. Rather, the Court concluded that the disproportionate reach of
the ADEA "while significant, does not alone provide the answer to our
§ 5 inquiry" because "[d]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies."' 5 7 In other words, the constitutionality of
the ADEA state-suit provision ultimately turned not on the overbreadth of the ADEA, which the Court conceded was tolerable on the
theory that the Act operated as a prophylactic measure, but instead on
the Court's assessment of the extent and insidiousness of unconstitutional, that is irrational, age discrimination by the states. Relying on
Flores and lorida Prepaid, the Court reasoned that the latter issue
could be resolved "by examining the legislative record containing the
reasons for Congress'[s] action."15 8 Thus, in the final analysis, the
ADFA's state-suit provision failed constitutional muster because the formal legislative record "lack[ed] . ..evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States." 5 9
Perhaps the most significant, and disturbing, aspect of Kimel is
the Court's justification of its decision to strike down the state-suit provision of the ADEA because, on the Court's reading of the legislative
record, "Congress' [s] 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem."1'6 The
Court thereby obliquely conceded its uncertainty as to whether unconstitutional age discrimination by the states is a problem of real
consequence. Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress lacked
power to address this problem, which Congress had clearly perceived
to be significant, because the legislative record lacked sufficient evi16
dence supporting that perception. '
Id. at 647 (quoting City of Boerne v. Hores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
Id. at 648.
158 I&
Id. at650. As in RoridaPrepaid, the Court in Mind continued formally to honor the
'59
proposition that "lack of support [in the legislative record] is not determinative of the § 5
inquiry." Id. at 649 (citing Rorida Prepaid,527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999) and Bore%521 U.S. at
531-32). At the same time, as in roi'da Prepaid,the Court's justification for holding the
challenged provision unconstitutional ultimately rested on the Court's determination that
the legislative record was inadequate. See Ruth Colker, The Setion Fve Quagmire,47 UCL
L REv. 653, 667-69 (2000) (noting that the Court's recent Section 5 cases require Congress
to create an ample record tojustify the need for legislation enacted under that provision).
160 Kime4 120 S.Ct. at 648-49 (emphasis added).
The Court's May 2000 decision in United States v.Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740 (2000),
161
provides further evidence that perceived gaps in the legislative record may tip the scales
against the constitutionality of a challenged statute. Monison held that Congress lacked
power, under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to
enact the civil remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). Id. at 1759.
156
157
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The Court has come a long way in the past six years. Turner f s
ambiguous suggestion ofjudicial power to require that Congress compile record evidence and make formal findings in support of its constitutional judgments has now been offered as the controlling rationale
for invalidating two major federal statutes. Therefore, the Court has,
without express justification or explanation, imposed upon Congress
procedural requirements akin to those imposed on federal administrative agencies.
II
WHAT'S WRONG WIT

THE COURT'S NEW APPROACH?

Part I of this Article describes a subtle, but nonetheless fundamentally important, shift in the way the Supreme Court reviews federal statutes. Specifically, we catalogued the Court's evolution from
the tentative suggestion in Turner I that Congress must provide "substantial evidence" to justify the exercise of its legislative powers, to the
FloridaPrepaidand Kimel rule that Congress must, at least in cases approaching the limits of its constitutional authority, predicate the exercise of its constitutional authority on express findings supported by
convincing record evidence. In so doing, the Court appears to have
applied procedural requirements to Congress similar to the requirements imposed on federal administrative agencies by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).162
This section of the Article considers whether this heightened
scrutiny of the legislative record in constitutional cases is appropriate.
For several reasons, we conclude that it is not.1 63 Part II first argues
that the Court's new approach is inconsistent with the Court's own
For a discussion of the Morrison Court's Commerce Clause analysis, see supra text accompanying notes 84-96. In dispensing with the Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Court
concluded that VAWA lacked the "congruence and proportionality" required of remedial
legislation enacted under Section 5 because VAWA "applie[d] uniformly throughout the
Nation" even though "Congress' [s] findings indicate that the problem of discrimination
against the victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all states, or even most
States." Morison, 120 S.Ct. at 1758-59. As Justice Breyer observed in his dissenting opinion, however, the relevant congressional findings nowhere concluded that the problem of
pervasive unconstitutional gender bias was limited to certain states. Id. at 1779 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Rather, the majority was disturbed that Congress had enacted nationwide legislation on the basis of reports documenting constitutional violations from "only" twentyone-not all fifty-states. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer asked rhetorically,
"Why can Congress not take the evidence before it as evidence of a national problem?" Id,
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme "Court ha[d] not previously held that
Congress must document the existence of a problem in every State prior to proposing a
national solution" and that "the deference this Court gives to Congress' [s] chosen remedy
under § 5 . . . suggests that any such requirement would be inappropriate" (citation
omitted)).
162 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).
163 Notably, although this trend appears to have gone largely unnoticed in the academic literature to date, the limited attention focused on the issue in the wake of Lopez
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precedents.' 64 Part II then explains that even putting precedent
aside, the Court's new approach raises substantial separation-of-powers concerns and ignores important realities of congressional fact165
finding.
A.

The Court's New Procedural Requirement is Inconsistent
with Precedent

Less than a decade ago, it was settled law that, outside of the narrow categories subject to the strictestjudicial scrutiny,'6 Congress was

under no obligation to make findings or compile an evidentiary record in support of the factual assumptions and predictive judgments
underlying federal statutes. This was, of course, not always the case.
Prior to the 1937 "switch in time," 167 the Court sometimes attached

great significance to the presence or absence of congressional findings or supporting evidence in the formal legislative record. But from
was, if anything, approving of the Court's increased emphasis on the legislative record in
constitutional adjudication. See supra note 10.
164 Infra Part HA
165 Infra Part H.B.
166 Although both the precise meaning and bounds of "strict scrutiny" are fluid, the
categories to which we allude here include, at a minimum, lam imposing racial classifications-see, ag., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 512 U.S. 200 (1995) (plurality opinion)
("[A]ll racial dassifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny."); Wygantv.Jackson Bd.of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (noting that, in the context of affirmative action, racial
classifications must be "supported by a compelling state purpose[] and.., the means
chosen to accomplish that purpose [must be] ...narrowly tailored."); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (noting that classification of persons according to race "are subject to the most exacting scrutiny")-religious classification-see, eg., Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (noting that the Court must apply strict scrutiny to charity registration law selectively exempting some, but not all, religious organizations)--contentbased regulations of speech-see, eg., Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S.
672, 678 (1992) (holding that regulation of speech on government property that has traditionally been available for public expression is subject to highest scrutiny); Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (holding that the government many only
regulate speech that is indecent but not obscene "to promote a compelling interest," and
must "choose[ ] the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest")-and limitations on fundamental rights-see, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding
that strict scrutiny applies to limitations on the right of interstate travel); Kramer v. Union
Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (holding that strict scrutiny applies to limitations on equal access to voting); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that
strict scrutiny applies to limitations on equal access to the judiciary). An analytis of hot-

the Court has treated the legislative record in these or other "heightened scrutiny' cases
lies well beyond the scope of this Article; we allude to them only to acknowledge that the
question of what demands the judiciary may legitimately place on congressional procedures in such cases may be different than in the Section 5 and Commerce Clause cases that
are our focus here.
167 See genera/!y 2 BRUcE ACKE.tAN, WE THE PEoPE TRANtusFoaAio's 363-65 & n.33
(1998) (discussingJustice Roberts's changed vote shortly after President Roosevelt promulgated his court-packing plan).
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the late 1930s to the early 1990s, the Court repeatedly repudiated this
approach.
This section briefly reviews the development of the rule that Congress need not compile a formal record in support of its decision to
legislate. This section focuses first on the Court's twentieth-century
treatment of the formal legislative record in cases challenging a particular statute as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause
of Article 1.168 It then reviews the history of the Court's treatment of
the formal legislative record in cases addressing Congress's power to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments.169 Finally, it discusses the Supreme Court's traditional reluctance to require Congress to make formal factual findings or
document the basis for its predictive judgments even in the context of
heightened judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.7 0 This history demonstrates that the Court's new approach conflicts with these
unchallenged precedents.
1.

Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause
a. Before the "Switch" of 1937

Prior to its post-1937 acquiescence in the constitutional innovations of the New Deal, the Supreme Court viewed with suspicion federal statutes premised on an expansive understanding of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. x7 1 One manifestation of this suspicion was
the Court's rigorous review of the legislative record supporting challenged statutes. Two cases from the early 1920s addressing congressional efforts to regulate grain-futures trading illustrate this approach.
In Hill v. Wallace,'7 2 the Court struck down the Grain Future
Trading Act of 1921 as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. 173 In an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, the Court reasoned that transactions for future delivery of grain between members
of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, to be settled by offsetting purchases or by delivery of warehouse receipts of grain stored in
Chicago, did not constitute interstate commerce. 7 4 The Court also
rejected the alternate argument that Congress could regulate these
transactions because of their impact on interstate commerce, emphasizing that no such impact was evident from the formal legislative re168

Infra Part lI.A.1.

169
170

Infra Part IIA2.
Infra Part IIA.3.

171

See DAVID P. CURIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CEN-

TURY 1888-1986, at 222-26 (1990).

172
173

259 U.S. 44 (1922).
Id. at 68-69.

174

Id. at 68-69.
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cord compiled by Congress. 175 The Court declared that, "without any
limitation... to interstate commerce, or to that which the Congress may
deemfrom evidence before it to be an obstruction to interstatecommerce, we do
not find it possible to sustain the validity of the regulations as they are
set forth in this act." 76 In order to make the reservation even clearer,
the Court reiterated that "sales for future delivery on the Board of
Trade are not in and of themselves interstate commerce" and "can not
come within the regulatory power of Congress as such, unless they are
regarded by Congress, from the evidence before it, as directly interfering with
interstatecommerce so as to be an obstruction or a burden thereon."177
The Court's hints in Hill were not lost on Congress. Congress
essentially reenacted the invalidated law the following year as the
Grain Futures Act with additional detailed findings based on evidence
gathered in public hearings. 178 Congress wrote its findings into section 3 of the Act, which declared that the prices of grain futures were
generally used "for determining the prices to the producer and the
consumer of grain... and to facilitate the movements thereof in interstate commerce." 179 Congress also found that trading in grain futures was "susceptible to speculation, manipulation, and control" that
resulted in "sudden or unreasonable fluctuations in... prices...
detrimental to the producer or the consumer and the persons handling grain ... in interstate commerce."' 8 0 Because, in Congress's
considered judgment, these "fluctuations in prices [were] an obstruction to and a burden upon interstate commerce in grain," Congress
rendered uniform, federal "regulation imperative for the protection
of such commerce and the national public interest therein."' 8 '
Congress's extensive post-Hill findings led the Court to uphold
the new Act in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen. 8 2- The Court, again
in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, recited in full the congressional
findings in section 3.183 The Court also acknowledged that the Act's
opponents had "submitted a large number of affidavits" at trial reflecting the "opinions of many professors of political economy in the colleges of the country to the effect that," contrary to Congress's
findings, "trading in futures in the long run did not depress prices,
175

176

d. at 68.

Id. (emphasis added).

177
d. at 69 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
178 Compare The Future Trading Act, Pub. L No. 67-66, 42 Stat. 187 (1921) (superseded by The Grain Futures Act, Pub. L No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922)), uith The Grain

Futures Act § 3, 42 Stat. at 999 (current version at Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1
(1999)) (discussing congressional findings).
179

The Grain Futures Act § 3, 42 Stat. at 999.

180
181

Id

182

262 U.S. 1 (1923).

183

Id. at 4-5.

Id.

358

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:328

but stabilized them." 184 The Court was impressed, however, that Congress's findings had drawn upon "many years of investigation and examination of witnesses, including the advocates of regulation and
those opposed, and men intimately advised in respect to the grain
markets of the country."'1 5 The Court recounted in some detail the
expert testimony at public hearings and the conclusions of the Senate
and House Agriculture committees, which supported the findings
186
written into the 1922 Act.

In light of this evidentiary support, the Court held that "we would
be unwarranted in rejecting the finding of Congress as unreasonable,
and that in our inquiry as to the validity of this legislation we must
accept the view that such manipulation does work to the detriment of
producers, consumers, shippers and legitimate dealers in interstate
commerce in grain."1 87 The Court distinguished Hill v. Wallace on the
basis that the 1921 Act lacked such well-supported findings' 8 8 and upheld the 1922 Act as within Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, thus effectively reversing its prior position on the underlying
constitutional question.' 8 9 Taken together, the Hill and Olsen cases
clearly indicate that in the pre-"switch" era, congressional findings,
supported by evidence in the legislative record, made a decisive difference in cases concerning Congress's Commerce Clause power.' 00
The Court's now-infamous 1936 decision in Carter v. Carter Coal
19
Co., 1 which struck down the labor-relations provisions of the Bitumi184

185
186
187

188

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 10-15.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 32-33. The Court stated:
The Grain Futures Act [of 1922] which is now before us differs from the
Future Trading Act [of 1921] in having the very features the absence of
which we held in the somewhat carefully framed language of [Hill v. Wallace] prevented our sustaining the Future Trading Act. As we have seen in
the statement of the case, the [1922J act only purports to regulate interstate
commerce and sales of grain for future delivery on boards of trade because

it finds that by manipulation they have become a constantly recurring burden and obstruction to that commerce. Instead, therefore, of being an authority against the validity of the Grain Futures Act [of 1922], [Hill v.
Wallace] is an authority in its favor.
Id.
Id at 40.
Frickey, supra note 10, at 708-09 (discussing Hilland Olsen); see also Norman v. Bait.
& Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 311-16 (1935) (stating that "Congress is entitled to its own
judgment" regarding decisive "determinations of questions of facts" (cited in Frickey, supra
note 10, at 709 n.82)); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922) ("[It is primarily for
Congress to consider and decide the fact of the danger and meet it. This court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress in such a manner unless the relationship... to interstate commerce... [is] clearly non-existent." (cited in Frickey, supra note
10, at 709 n.82)).
191 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
189
190
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nous Coal Conservation Act of 1935,192 reinforced this lesson in dramatic fashion. In an opinion by Justice Sutherland, the Court

dismissed as "pure assumption" the congressional conclusion written
into the first section of the Act that "the production and distribution
of [bituminous] coal 'directly affect[s] interstate commerce. ' " 19 3 Similarly, the court rejected as too speculative Congress's view that the
nation's "industrial activities [and] transportation facilities" 19 4 had become so dependent on the steady production and distribution of bitu-

minous coal as to render congressional regulation of the latter
"imperative for the protection of [interstate] commerce."1 9 5 Thus,
the CarterCoal decision, like Olsen, implicitly directed Congress to document in the formal legislative record the "direct" effect on interstate
commerce of conduct targeted by a federal statute, or else to expect
invalidation on grounds of exceeding congressional power under the
Commerce Clause.1 9 6
b. After the "Switch"
Justice Roberts's decisive vote in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,97
which on March 29, 1937, upheld state wage and hours legislation
governing employment of women and children,19 8 has been accorded
the dubious distinction of being the "switch in time that saved nine"
by dissipating support for President Roosevelt's then-pending proposal to "pack" the Court.1 99 But of far greater contemporary significance was the Court's decision later that same term in NationalLabor
RelationsBoard v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,200 which upheld the Nad at 310.
193 Id. at 290 (quoting The Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, § 1, 49
Stat. 991, 992).
'194 Id. at 279 (summarizing section 1 of the Act, § 1, 49 Stat. at 991-92).
195 Id. at 280 (summarizing section 1 of the Act, § 1, 49 Stat. at 991-92); see also id. at
309 ("Such effect as [labor disputes in the coal mining industry] may have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and indirect.").
196
Indeed, in the wake of cases such as Olsen and CarterCoa4 attorneys in the Roosevelt
Administration-including Charles Fahy, then General Counsel of the NLRB-thought
careful drafting and substantiation of appropriate congressional findings to be essential to
a successful constitutional defense of the National Labor Relations Act. Frickey, supra note
10, at 698-99 & n.25.
197 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
198 I. at 400.
199 See 2 Acitmn
, supranote 167, at 363-64. In ie prior term,Jtstice Roberts iad
joined with the four conservative Justices, then widely known as the "four horsemen," to
strike down a law quite similar to those at issue in ParishL Se id. at 363. Justice Roberts's
failure to write an opinion explaining his decision to abandon his earlier position made his
motivations the subject of "endless controversy-with [legal] realists making his switch into
a symbol of the potency of the President's unconventional threat, and legalists defending
Roberts against the taint of political jurisprudence." Id. at 364.
200
301 U.S. 1 (1937), abrogationrecognized by United States v. Taylor, 226 F.3d 593 (7th
Cir. 2000).
192
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tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA) as within Congress's Commerce
Clause power. 20 ' In an opinion by ChiefJustice Hughes, the Courtwithout expressly overruling Carter Coal-held that at least with respect to nationwide industries, the danger of divisive labor disputes
had a "direct" enough impact on interstate commerce to justify congressional regulation. 202 Four years later, in United States v,Darby,203 a
unanimous Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
(FLSA), which set minimum wages and maximum hours for employees producing "goods, which, at the time of production, the employer
...intends

or expects to move in interstate commerce."20 4 In so do-

ing, the Darby Court acknowledged that neither its holding nor that of

Jones & Laughlin could be reconciled with Carter CoaL205'

A rarely noticed aspect of the Jones & Laughlin and Darby deci200
sions, which are widely and correctly regarded as "watershed" cases,
is that, unlike Hill, Olsen, and Carter Coal, the post-1936 decisions attached little significance to the existence of congressional findings of
fact or legislative-record evidence. Rather, Jones & Laughlin and Darby
turned on the Court's assessment, apart from any congressional findings or record evidence, of the relationship between labor peace and
interstate commerce.
In Jones & Laughlin, the Court relegated to a footnote in the
background portion of the opinion the extensive findings that Congress had written into section 1 of the NLRA.20 7 The Court's sole,
oblique reference in the text of its opinion to these findings and the
supporting legislative record was its observation that questions concerning the impact of labor disputes on interstate commerce "have
frequently engaged the attention of Congress and have been the sub201

Id. at 43; see 2 AcarpmPAN, supra note 167, at 4884 n.34. Ackerman asserts that
If any single case is crucial, it was Jones & Laughlin, not Parrish. ifJustice
Roberts hadjoined the four conservatives in striking down the [NLRA], the
Justices would have deprived the New Deal of its only creative solution to
the proliferating sit-down strikes that were precipitating all-out class war in
America's industrial heartland.

Id.
202 Jones & Laughlin, 301
203 312 U.S. 100 (1941),
(7th Cir. 2000).
204 Id. at 118.
205

U.S. at 41-43.
abrogationrecognized by United States v. Taylor, 226 F.d 593

Id. at 123 ("So far as Carterv. CarterCoal Co.... is inconsistent with this conclusion,

its doctrine is limited in principle by the decisions under the Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations Act [includingJones &Laughlin], which we have cited and which we
follow." (citation omitted)).
206 E.g., Frickey, supra note 10, at 708; see also, e.g., CuRuE, supra note 171, at 236-38
(stating that Jones & Laughlin was a "real breakthrough," which Darby confirmed).
207 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 23 n.2. Notably, prior to the Court's decision in Jones
& Laughlin, Solicitor of Labor Charles Fahy, along with other prominent lawyers in the
Roosevelt Administration, had pinned their hopes for sustaining the NLRA on the inclusion of carefully crafted, detailed findings in the text of the Act. Supra note 196.
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ject of many inquiries." 20° Similarly, in Darby, the Court's sole reliance
on the express congressional findings of fact and legislative record in
support of the Act was to note that Congress "recognized that in present day industry, competition by a small part may affect the whole

and that the total effect of the competition of many small producers

may be great."20 9 The Court's relative lack of interest in the legislative
record injones & Laughlin and Darby,when contrasted with its scrutiny
of the formal legislative record in Hill, Olsen, and CarterCoal, signaled
a shift in the Court's approach to congressional findings and supporting evidence in Commerce Clause cases.
The Court's decisions in subsequent decades confirmed that
Congress was under no obligation to make factual findings or compile an evidentiary record in support of even highly attenuated assertions of its Commerce Clause power. The Court first disposed of the
claim that formal findings written into the text of the statute should
be required. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States210 and Katzenbach v. McClung,2 1 ' two companion cases decided the same day, the
Court upheld the public-accommodations provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as an appropriate exercise of Congress's power
under the Commerce Clause.2 1 2 In so doing, the Court rejected the
argument that the Act was constitutionally deficient because it lacked
formal findings of fact stating Congress's belief that racial discrimination in hotels and restaurants substantially burdened interstate commerce.2 18 The Court noted that "both Houses of Congress conducted
prolonged hearings on the Act,"2 14 and concluded that, although
Congress had made explicit findings in support of the NLRA and the
FLSA, the absence of such findings in the Civil Rights Act was "not
fatal to the validity of the statute.., for the evidence presented at the
hearings fully indicated the nature and effect of the burdens on com2 15
merce which Congress meant to alleviate."
The Court also indicated that, so long as the members of Congress, "in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational
basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce," the resulting statute would fall within Congress's
208 Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 43. In support of the quoted observation, the Court
cited, along with other nonlegislative studies, one twenty-one-year-old report and another
thirty-five-year-old report of two congressional commissions tasked to study labor relations.
IK at 43 n.8.
209

Darby, 312 U.S. at 123.

379 U.S. 241 (1964), abrogation recoonized by United States %.Taylor, 226 F.3d 593
(7th Cir. 2000).
210

211
212
213
214
215

379 U.S. 294 (1964).
1. at 305; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261.
McClung 379 U.S. at 304; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252.
McClung, 379 U.S. at 299; see Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 246.
McClung 379 U.S. at 304 (citation omitted).
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Commerce Clause power.2 1 6 Thus, in considering the constitutionality of the Act as applied to restaurants that sold food shipped in interstate commerce, the Court found "the absence of direct evidence
connecting discriminatory restaurant service with the flow of interstate food" immaterial.2 1 7 The court found sufficient the inference
that racial discrimination in restaurants would adversely impact the
21 8
interstate flow of food.
Having established in these cases that Congress need not make
formal findings of fact, the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz2 19 further clarified that, notwithstanding its reliance on congressional committee
hearings in upholding the Civil Rights Act, Congress need not compile a supporting legislative record evidencing the relationship between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. 22 0 In Wirtz, the
Court upheld the 1961 amendments to the FLSA that expanded the
Act's coverage from just those workers producing goods for interstate
commerce to all workers "'employed in an enterprise engaged in [interstate] commerce or in the production of goods for [interstate]
commerce.' ' 221 The effect of these amendments "was to extend protection to the fellow employees of any employee who would have been
protected by the original Act, but not to enlarge the class of employers
subject to the Act." 222 The parties challenging these amendments as
beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause attempted to
distinguish Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClungby arguing that in those
cases "Congress had undertaken extensive investigation of the commercial need for the" Civil Rights Act of 1964, whereas "the legislative
history of the amendments" to the FLSA "la[id] no factual predicate
22 3
for extensions of the original Act."
The Court relegated this argument, which it described as a "major contention" of the amendments' challengers, to a footnote, disId. at 303-04 (emphasis added).
217 Id. at 304-05.
218
Id. at 299, 304-05. The Court noted that testimony at congressional hearings
demonstrated that
[a] comparison of per capita spending by Negroes in restaurants, theaters,
and like establishments indicated less spending, after discounting income
differences, in areas where discrimination is widely practiced.... This diminutive spending springing from a refusal to serve Negroes and their total
loss as customers has, regardlessof the absenceof direct evidence, a close connection to interstate commerce. The fewer customers a restaurant enjoys the
less food it sells and consequently the less it buys.
Id. at 299 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
219
(1976).
220
Id. at 190 n.13.
221
Id. at 188 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a), 207(a) (1964)).
222
Id.
223 Id. at 190 n.13.
216
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missing the point as "irrelevant."224 The Court explained that it was
"not concerned with the manner in which Congress reached its factual conclusions." 22 5 Rather, the Court upheld the amendments because it was able on its own to identify a "rational basis" for the
conclusion that the wages and hours of workers employed by firms
conducting business across state lines had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to justify congressional regulation.22 Wirlz thus
firmly entrenched the principle that Congress was under no obligation to make factual findings or compile a factual record to support
novel assertions of its Commerce Clause authority.
2.

Congress's Power to Enforce the ReconstructionAmendments

When Congress enacted the sweeping and revolutionary reforms
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,227 it expressly invoked its power
under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to enforce that Amendment's guarantee that "It]he right.., to vote shall not be denied or
abridged... on account of race [or] color."2 28 In South Carolinav.
Katzenbach,229 the first of numerous decisions concerning the Act and
its subsequent amendments, the Court upheld its core provisions as
an appropriate exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment. 2 30 To justify the Act's novel and potentially intrusive remedial scheme, Chief Justice Warren's opinion for the Court relied
heavily on congressional findings and the supporting evidence in the

legislative record that demonstrated that resistance to black Americans' enfranchisement remained pervasive and therefore required ex23
traordinary remedies. '
At the outset of its analysis, the Court declared that "[t]he constitutional propriety of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 must be judged
with reference to the historical experience which it reflects." 2 - The
Court approvingly observed:
Before enacting the measure, Congress explored with great care the
problem of racial discrimination in voting. The House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary each held hearings for nine da)s and
received testimony from a total of 67 witnesses. More than three
224
225

IdId.

226

1& at 190.

227

Pub. L No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973

(1994)).
228 U.S. GONST. amend. XV,
229
230

231
232

383 U.S. 301 (1966).
Id- at 337.
Id. at 308-09.
Id. at 308.
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full days were consumed discussing the bill on the floor of the
2 35
House, while the debate in the Senate covered 26 days in all.

The Court read this "voluminous legislative history" to demonstrate
"vividly" that Congress intended the Act to reverse the course of "an
insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain
parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of
the Constitution." 234 The Court agreed with Congress's conclusion
that, to achieve this goal, prior "unsuccessful remedies... ha[d] to be
replaced by sterner and more elaborate measures in order to satisfy
235
the clear commands of the Fifteenth Amendment."
Among the most controversial of the Act's provisions was section
4(a), which suspended literacy tests and similar voting qualifications
in covered jurisdictions for a period of five years from the last occurrence of substantial voting discrimination. 236 This blanket prohibition on literacy tests diverged sharply from the Court's prior holding
in Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections23 7 that literacy tests
were not in themselves contrary to the Fifteenth Amendment. 2 38 In
light of this holding, South Carolina argued that the Act's literacy test
ban could not be held to enforce that same Amendment. 23 9 The
Court disagreed. Because the legislative record demonstrated "that in
most of the States covered by the Act, including South Carolina, various tests and devices ha[d] been instituted with the purpose of disen-

franchising Negroes, ha[d] been framed in such a way as to facilitate
this aim, and ha[d] been administered in a discriminatory fashion for
many years,"240 the Court deferred to Congress's conclusion that
these tests must be proscribed to effectuate the promise of the Fif24 1
teenth Amendment.
The Court's opinion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach did not expressly state that a novel exercise of Congress's power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments required congressional findings or supporting record evidence to pass constitutional muster. But the
Id. at 308-09 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 309.
235 Id. In support of these conclusions, the Court dedicated the next three pages of its
opinion to a summary of "the majority reports of the House and Senate Committees, which
document in considerable detail the factual basis for" the Act. Id.
236 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 438 (codified as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1994)). Section 4(a)'s prohibition was itself defeaslble "if the [State or political subdivision] obtain [ed] a declaratory judgment from the District Court for the District of Columbia, determining that tests and devices have not been
used during the preceding five years to abridge the franchise on racial grounds." Kaizenbach, 383 U.S. at 318.
237 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
238 Id. at 53.
239 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 333.
240 Id. at 333-34 (citing House and Senate Reports in support of the Act).
241 See id. at 337.
233
234
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Court's reliance in that case on the record supporting the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 could fairly have been read to advance such a requirement. This reading of Katzenbach would have constituted a substantial limit on Congress's enforcement authority because, as one
commentator recently observed, the extent and quality of the legisla-

tive record compiled in support of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 "is
unique among modern legislation under the Enforcement
Clauses." 2412 Just a few months after its South Carolina v. Kaizenbach
decision, however, the Court clarified that an exercise of congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments required
neither formal findings of fact nor evidentiary support in the legislative record. 243
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,244 decided later in the October 1965
term, the Court upheld section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act-a provision not at issue in South Carolinav. Katzenbach-asa valid exercise of
Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 215 In order "to secure the rights under the fourteenth
amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which
the predominant classroom language was other than English," section
4(e) prohibited the use of a literacy test to disenfranchise any "person
who... has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public
school in, or a private school accredited by, any State or territory, the
District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which"
classes were conducted in a foreign language.2- 16 As a practical matter,
the primary effect of this provision was to enfranchise those educated
in Spanish-language schools, particularly "the several hundred thousand" Puerto Rican residents of New York City. 2 4 7 The Court rea-

soned that notwithstanding Lassiter's holding that literacy tests were
constitutionally permissible, 248 the limited prohibition in section 4(e)

on the use of such tests furthered the Fourteenth Amendment's

promise of "the equal protection of the laws"249 in two distinct wa)s.25
Specifically, the Court found that section "4(e) may be viewed as
a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New

242

Douglas Laycock, Coneptual Gulfs in City of Boerne %.Flores, 39 WM-a. &

REV. 743, 748 (1998).

Miva"L

243 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966), abrogationrecogniwd biVamer
v.Ill. State Univ., 150 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 1998).
244 384 U.S. 641 (1966), abrogationrecognized by Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 150 F.Sd 706
(7th Cir. 1998).
245 Id. at 652, 658.
246 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L No. 89-110, § 4(e) (2), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1994)).
247 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 644-45 & n.3.
248 Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959).
249
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
250 Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652.
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York nondiscriminatory treatment by government-both in the imposition of voting qualifications and the provision or administration of
governmental services, such as public schools, public housing and law
enforcement." 25 1 Regarding voting qualifications, section 4(e) was a
proper means to shelter New York's Puerto Rican community from
invidious discrimination hidden in either the purposes or the administration of New York's voter eligibility requirements. 25 2 Under the
governmental-services rationale, the Court reasoned that by increasing the political clout of the Puerto Rican community, section 4(e)
empowered that community to protect itself against discrimination in
the allocation of public benefits and, thus, secured to it the equal protection of the laws. 253 The Court therefore concluded that because
section 4(e) had the effect of extending the franchise, "the right that
is 'preservative of all rights,"' 25 4 to a greater portion of New York's
Puerto Rican community, the provision fell within Congress's power
255
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
As Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent, however, the Court's
theories linking section 4(e) to the Fourteenth Amendment found no

support in congressional findings of fact or evidence in the legislative
record. 256 Specifically, neither source set forth evidence that New
York's literacy requirement, either as originally proposed or as contemporarily administered, was infected with discriminatory bias.25 7

Nor, injustice Harlan's words,
was there any showing whatever to support the Court's alternative
argument that § 4(e) should be viewed as but a remedial measure
designed to cure or assure against unconstitutional discrimination
of other varieties, e.g., in 'public schools, public housing and law
enforcement,' ... to which Puerto Rican minorities might be subject in such communities as New York. There is simply no legislative
258
record supporting such hypothesized discrimination.
251
252

Id.
Id. at

653-56.

Id. at 652-53.
254 Id. at 652 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
255
Id.
256 Id. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Laycock, supra note 242, at 748 (noting,
with respect to the Court's decision in Morgan, that "the congressional record said nothing
about discrimination in public services in New York"); Saul M. Pilchen, Politicsv. The Clois.
ter Deciding Whzen The Supreme Court Should Defer to CongressionalFactfinding Under The PostCivil War Amendments, 59 Nora DAME L. REv. 337, 348 (1984) ("[I]n Morgan there was no
record evidence to support the federal statute.").
257
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that New York's nondiscriminatory justification for the literacy requirement had not been refuted because "no
... factual data provide a legislative record supporting § 4(e) by way of showing that Spanish-speaking citizens are fully as capable of making informed decisions in a New York election as are English-speaking citizens" (footnote omitted)).
258 Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting) (footnote and citation omitted).
253
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Thus, unlike the provisions at issue in South Carolinav. Kalzenbach, section 4(e) was not defensible on the ground that it was justified by
evidence in the legislative record.
For Justice Harlan and Justice Stew%-art, who joined Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Morgan, that difference should have
dictated a different outcome in the two cases.2 59 But that difference
was immaterial to the seven-Justice majority in Morgan, which upheld
section 4(e) even though the factual assumptions underlying the provision lacked support in express congressional findings or record evidence. 260 The Court's decision in Morgan thus made unmistakably
dear that congressional findings of fact, or legislative record evidence
in support thereof, were no more required under the enforcement
sections of the Reconstruction Amendments than they were, after
1937, under the Commerce Clause. Subsequent judicial decisions,
and unchallenged congressional action, confirmed this
26
understanding. '
3.

CongressionalRegulation of Speech

Even a cursory effort to catalogue the Supreme Court's treatment
of the legislative record in cases decided under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment would necessarily expand far beyond
the scope of this Artidcle. 262 Moreover, as this Article acknowledges, it
may be that the considerations relevant to the proper treatment of the
legislative record in cases requiring "strict" judicial scrutiny are quite
different from those in cases attendant on "rational basis" review, like
the Commerce Clause and Section 5 decisions that are the primary
focus of this Article. Yet, even when core First Amendment interests
were at stake, the Court had, prior to Turner , frequently held that
Congress was under no obligation to create a legislative record demonstrating the correctness of the underlying factual assumptions of a
challenged restriction of speech.
Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC-63 is one relatively
recent case indicating that Congress need not create a record support259
260
261

Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 656.

Laycock, supra note 242, at 747-58 (collecting and discussing cases and statutes reflecting assumption that even novel assertions of Congress's power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments would be upheld even though unsupported by relevant findings by
Congress or evidence in the legislative record).

262

Notably, however, others have attempted this task and found the Court's approach

to the legislative record in such cases rife with inconsistency and confusion. Eg., William
E. Lee, ManipulatingLegislativeFacts: The Supreme Court and the FirstAmindment, 72 Tt- L
REv. 1261, 1263-64 (1998) ("[T]he extent to which the Court believes that it should accept

legislative facts in First Amendment cases varies dramatically. The Court has never attempted to reconcile its different approaches to legislative facts." (footnote omitted)).
263

492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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ing its factual conclusions, even when enacting a statute subject to the
most exacting judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment. 26 4 Sable
addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute banning both obscene and indecent commercial telephone messages, a response to
the then-incipient "dial-a-porn" industry. 26 5 The Court upheld the
statute insofar as it applied to obscene and thus constitutionally unprotected communications, but struck down the ban on indecent
messages, holding that it violated the First Amendment. 266 The Court
reasoned that a total criminal prohibition on indecent telephone
messages was a content-based regulation of speech subject to strictjudicial scrutiny.2 67 The Court held that such scrutiny would not permit
legislators to limit adult speech to that suitable for children when alternative regulatory schemes already devised by the FCC constituted
viable, less restrictive alternatives, even if those alternatives could result in some children being exposed to indecency.2 68
In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that the legislative
record was devoid of any assertion that minors would have circumvented the FCC's restrictions with significant frequency. 269 Justice
Scalia, who joined Justice White's majority opinion, wrote separately
to dispel any inference that might otherwise have been drawn from
the Court's discussion of the statute's legislative history.270 He joined
the Court's opinion "with the understanding that its examination of
the legislative history is merely meant to establish that no more there
than anywhere else can data be found demonstrating the infeasibility
of alternative means to provide.., adequate protection of minors. 271
He emphasized that the Court's opinion ought not be read "to sugId. at 129-31.
Id. at 117-18.
266 Id. at 124, 131.
267 Id. at 126 (holding that the ban on indecent messages could be upheld only if it
constituted the least restrictive means available to further a compelling governmental
interest).
264
265

268

Id. at 128-31.

269 Id. at 130. The Court's reference to the legislative record is perhaps best understood as demonstrating that Congress's policy conclusion that the total ban was necessary
to protect minors-a judgment to which the Court was invited to defer by the Solicitor
General-was not predicated on a factual conclusion that a significant number of children
were likely to be exposed to indecency. Rather, the statute reflected Congress's weighing
of the relative importance of protecting free expression, on the one hand, and sheltering a
few minors from occasional exposure to sexually explicit messages, on the other. Not surprisingly, the Court reserved to itself the balancing of those interests. See id. at 131 (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("It should not be missed that we are making a value judgment with respect
to the indecency portion of the statute."); see also Lee, supra note 262, at 1295 (concluding
that "[t]he Court's criticism of the legislative history should not be read as a requirement
that legislatures have factual data before them"); supra note 33 (discussing a similar decision by the Court in Landmark Communications,Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)).
270 Sabe, 492 U.S. at 131 (Scalia, J., concurring).
271 Id. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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gest that such data must have been before Congress in order for the
law to be valid."2 72 To the contrary, he understood the Court's prece-

dents to be clear that "[n]either due process nor the First Amendment requires legislation to be supported by committee reports, floor
debates, or even consideration, but only by a vote."27 3 Thus, in Sable,
the total ban would have been constitutional if less restrictive regulatory alternatives were in fact infeasible, even though "'[n] o Congressman or Senator purported to present a considered judgment'" on the
issue.2 74 Significantly, no other Justice disputed Justice Scalia's view

that the constitutionality of a federal statute should not depend on
whether Congress had created an adequate record, even in the context of strict judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.
The cases discussed in this section established the general rule
that Congress need not articulate findings or compile an evidentiary
record in support of the factual assumptions or predictive judgments
underlying federal statutes. In these and other cases, the Court repeatedly held that the absence of congressional findings or supporting evidence is not generally fatal to a challenged statute. Today,
none of the cases has been overruled, but much has changed. The
Court's new approach appears to reflect a fundamental shift toward

the analysis of the pre-New Deal era.275 This step back is not only
inconsistent with precedent, but also fundamentally misguided as an
analytical matter.

B. The Court's New Approach is Fundamentally Ill Advised
The Court's recent imposition of a requirement that Congress
compile a formal legislative record in support of the exercise of its
constitutional authority is not only inconsistent with the Court's own
precedents, but is also ill advised. The Court's new approach is misguided for three reasons: (1) Congress is not an agency, and the reasons for "on-the-record" review in the administrative context do not
apply to the legislative branch; (2) the Court's imposition of new, procedural conditions on Congress's exercise of its legislative authority
raises substantial constitutional questions under the Rules andJournal
Clauses, the Speech or Debate Clause, and the political question doctrine; and (3) the Court's new approach is simply inconsistent with
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
273 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
274
d. (ScaliaJ., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion, id. at 130) (alteration in
original); see also Lee, supra note 262, at 1296 (interpretingJustice Scalia's concurring opinion in SabLe to mean "that thejudiciary should not interfere ith how the legislative branch
chooses to enact laws" because "[t]he effect of [a] law and the question of vdhether it
narrowly senes sufficiently important interests can be determined ithout a requirement
that the legislature follow some specified method of gathering and evaluating data").
275 See supra Part ll.A.1 (a) (discussing the pre-New Deal era anal)sis).
272

CORNELL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 86:328

the realities of congressional fact-finding as envisioned by the
Constitution.
1.

The Purposes of "On-the-Record" Review Do Not Apply to Review
of CongressionalEnactments

From Justice Kennedy's invocation of a "substantial evidence" requirement in Turner 176 to the Kimel Court's declaration that the validity of the state-suit provision of the ADEA depended on "the
legislative record containing the reasons for Congress's action,"2 77 the
Court's emerging approach to the legislative record resembles nothing so much as the careful, on-the-record review of agency action that
has developed under the APA.278 We pause only briefly here to observe what should essentially go without saying-that the purposes of
such review in the administrative context do not apply to judicial review of federal statutes.
The reasons for close scrutiny of agency action under the APA
have constitutional, political, and practical dimensions. On the constitutional front, the "uneasy' status of administrative agencies has
been the subject of extensive scholarly and judicial inquiry.279 The
crux of the problem, of course, is that the Constitution expressly delegates "[a] 11 legislative powers" of the federal government to the "Congress of the United States,"28 0 the "executive Power" 28 ' to the
President, and the 'judicial Power ' 28 2 to the courts. Nowhere does
the Constitution authorize the creation of administrative agencies,
and the Framers certainly could never have foreseen the rise of executive amalgams-like the Federal Communications Commission and
276
277

Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994) (plurality opinion).
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 648 (2000).

278 E.g., Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986) (recognizing that "Congress' [s] need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task

of governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibil.

ity of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision"), overruling
recognized by Garcia v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., No. 92C20327, 1993 WL 184213

(N.D. Ill. May 28, 1993); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)
(requiring that the agency provide an "adequate" explanation for its decision, based on the
administrative record); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) ("The grounds upon
which an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses
that its action was based."); see alsoAdministrative Procedure Act § 2, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994)

(requiring reviewing courts to set aside agency action that is arbitrary and capricious or
"unsupported by substantial evidence").
279
E.g., Symposium, The Uneasy ConstitutionalStatus ofthe AdministrativeAgencies, 36 Ast.
U. L. Ray. 277 (1987); Paul R. Verkuil, Separationof Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. Rxv. 301, 331-32 (1989) (addressing the important role

that the APA rules have played in preventing agencies from encroaching on the prerogatives of other branches of government).
280
U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 1.
281
Id. art.II, § 1,cl. 1.
282 Id. art. III, § 1.
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the Federal Trade Commission-endowed with powers of all three
theoretically "separate" branches. Thus, if taken literally, the Constitution's "separation of powers" among the three coordinate branches
might lead to the conclusion that "the administrative state is unconstitutional"-that "[t]here is no room for a fourth branch within this
tripartite scheme of governance." 28 3 Although the Supreme Court
84
has understandably been loathe to embrace that extreme position, ,
close judicial scrutiny of agency action may be understood partially as
a response to the uncomfortable constitutional status of the administrative state.
In addition to this somewhat abstract constitutional reason for
careful judicial scrutiny of agency action, there are dearly more concrete political and practical needs for such oversight. Most significantly, the modern administrative state's claim to legitimacy has been,
from the outset, one of expertise rather than political accountability.28 5 Accordingly, judicial review, and particularly review based on
283 Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administratie State:. Toward a ConstitutionalThemy of the Second Best, 80 CoRNEm L RE%. 1, 2-3 (1994) (proposing
that the Supreme Court should nonetheless continue to "tolerate structures or practices
that are conceded to be unconstitutional when such structures or practices have become
institutionalized"); see also Stephen L Carter, ConstitutionalImpropniedes: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison, andAdministrative Government, 57 U. CI. L REv. 357, 363 (1990) (observing that although "itseems unlikely that the Supreme Court will at any time in the near
future strike down as unconstitutional any of the major aspects of the administrative
state[,] ... [s]trong arguments are still available that independent agencies have the status
of constitutional outlaws, something contrary to the evident constitutional plan").
284 In particular, after a brief flirtation with the so-called "nondelegation doctrine," see
A-LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (holding that
delegation of legislative power without limitation ias unconstitutional), implied overruding
recognized by United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1988); Panama Ref. Co. v. R)an,
293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (applying nondelegation doctrine to invalidate congressional
enactment), implied overruling recognized by United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.
1988), the Supreme Court essentially abandoned efforts to prevent executive agencies
from exercising a significant measure of both "legislative" and "judicial"authority. Se, e.g.,
Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 858 (1986) (upholding the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission's power to resolve common law disputes); Am.
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (rejecting the argument that the Occupational Safety and Health Act was unconstitutional because it delegated to the agency the
power to make fundamental policy decisions). See generally DNVID SCHOENBROD, POwu.R
WrITHOUT RESPONSIBIuIv How CoNcmRss ABusEs rH PEOPLE THROuGH DEL.aEOxro 13
(1993) (discussing how "large corporations ... labor unions, cause-based groups, and
other cohesive minority interests sometimes can use delegation to triumph over the interests of the larger part of the general public"); Peter L Strauss, The Place of Agendes in
Government" Separationof Powers and the Fourth Brand, 84 COLut. L REv. 573, 575 (1984)
("At the root of these problems lies a difficulty in understanding the relationships between
the agencies that actually do the work of law-administration, whose existence is barely
hinted at in the Constitution, and the three constitutionally named repositories of all governmental power.").
285 See, e.g., I KENNETH CuL' DAVIS & Ric:AmJ. PitERc,Jn., AD.sNwsTnm' Luw TnL,TISE § 1.7, at 27 (3d ed. 1994) (observing thatjudicial review of agency action has been
heavily influenced by "the New Deal era assumption that agency decisions are made by
apolitical technocrats"); Martin Shapiro, AdministrativeDiscretion: The Next Stag, 92 YLE
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the formal administrative record, is necessary to ensure that agency
decision making is genuinely a product of that expertise. Indeed, absent such review, experience has shown that agencies are subject to
"agency capture," or the tendency "to pursue the interests of the industries they regulate [I] and not the general public interest, since the
regulated industries ha[ve] far better access and opportunity to influence agency decisions in their favor. '28 6 "[E] nhanced Ijudicial] scrutiny of agency decisions," 28 7 such as the on-the-record review required
by Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe,28s is therefore necessary to
address these concerns of political accountability and agency capture.28 9 Clearly, however, while these constitutional and practical concerns justify enhanced review in the agency context, they are
inapplicable to judicial review of congressional enactments or, rather,
they counsel againstheightened scrutiny of the congressional record.
First, notions of separation of powers suggest that the judiciary has
little authority to impose requirements regarding the kind of legislaLJ. 1487, 1496 (1983) (discussing the influx of administrative agencies during the New
Deal period and how "[t]he watchword of administration became expertise, and the key
doctrine ofjudicial review of administrative action became deference to that expertise").
286 Patricia M. Wald, JudicialReview in Midpassage: The Uneasy PartnershipBetween Courts
and Agencies Plays On, 32 TuLsA LJ. 221, 226 (1996) (noting additionally that "[r]epeated
instances in which agencies acted to protect regulated... carriers against new entrants to
the motor freight industry, [has] made courts wary of agency motivations and unwilling
any longer to accept their rationales on faith"); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory
and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CM.-KErr L. R;v. 1039 (1997) (arguing thatjudicial activism
during that era was based on the federal judiciary's ideology that agencies were vulnerable
to "capture"); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American AdministrativeLau, 88 HARv.
L. REv. 1669, 1681-88, 1713-15 (1975) (asserting that "[iut has become widely accepted, not
only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by
some agency members, that the comparative over-representation of regulated or client in.
terests in the process of agency decisions results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these
interests"); Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: 7h'enty Years
of Law and Politics, LAv & ConrNMp. PROBs., Autumn 1991, at 249, 264-68 (discussing capture theorists' argument "that transferring governmental authority into the hands of regulatory agencies, would sooner or later, put the foxes in charge of the chicken coop"). Cf
generallyROBERT C. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION: THE PUBLIC INTEREST
AND THE ICC 1 (1970) ("The ICC was set up by Congress... to protect the public interest
....In fact, the agency is predominately a forum at which transportation interests divide
up the national transportation market."); LAWRENCE S. ROTHENBERG, REGULATION, ORGA.NZATIONS, AND POLITICS: MOTOR FREIGHT POLICY AT THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION

4 (1994) ("The ICC is the agency associated with the development of the concept of regulatory capture,which stipulates that producer groups dominate the agency that is assigned to
regulate them.").
287 Wald, supranote 286, at 226.
288 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
289 Wald, supra note 286, at 226; see also Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for
JudicialReview of Rulemaking,85 VA. L. REV.1243, 1314 (1999) (stating that "[a] now-prominent justification of'judicial review of agency rulemaking is the avoidance of special interest manipulation of the regulatory process"); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the
New Dea4 101 HARv.L. Rxv. 421, 469-71 (1987) (discussing ajustification for the APA "hard
look" doctrine as a deterrent to "agency subversion of statutory purposes," including "impermissible influences in the regulatory process").
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five record that Congress must compile when enacting a statute. Second, concepts of access and accountability suggest that Congress is
much better situated than the courts to make judgments about the
need for legislation.
2.

ConstitutionalProblensPosed by JudicialReview of Congressional
Procedures

Justice Souter's Lopez dissent 2 90 chastised the majority for hinting
that its result might have been different had Congress made explicit
findings linking the regulated conduct to interstate commerce.2' In
his words, to mandate congressional findings would presuppose "ajudicial authority... to require Congress to act with some high degree
of deliberateness, of which express findings would be evidence. But
review... for deliberateness would be as patently unconstitutional as
"- 2
an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court.
Given the Court's recent shift, however, it is appropriate to revisit
some of the constitutional and policy reasons underlying the more
traditional view expressed by Justice Souter and others that the Court
lacks the power to mandate congressional findings or procedures.
Thus, this analysis identifies some of the separation-of-powers
problems raised by aggressive judicial demands on the legislative record Congress creates when it enacts a statute. At least two distinct
sources of constitutional concern counsel against extending judicial
scrutiny of statutes beyond Congress's final product to an examination
of the steps taken to achieve that end. First, it is far from clear that
the Court's now well-established authority to review statutes supplies
any affirmative grant of power for the Court to influence Congress's
deliberation prior to enacting a law.29 3 Second, the Constitution itself
both expressly and implicitly imposes limits on judicial intrusion into
the workings of Congress.
a.

The ClassicalModel ofJudicial Review

Although at times in the Supreme Court's history the point appears to have been forgotten, the classical, theoretical justification for
290

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603-14 (1995)

(Souter,

J.,

dissenting),

supereded by statute as stated in United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999); see
supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
291 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 613-14 (SouterJ., dissenting).
292 Id. at 614 (Souter, J., dissenting). Of course, as discussed in Part I, tie %iewexpressed by justice Souter was well established prior to 1995, when Lopez vs decided. Indeed, even the Lopez majority cited precedent for the proposition that "Congress need
[not] make particularized findings in order to legislate." Id. at 563 (quoting Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (alteration in original)).
293 For example, both Philip Frickey and Harold Krent merely assume that the Court
has the power to influence Congress's deliberation prior to enacting a law. Frickey, supra
note 10, at 697; Krent, supra note 10, at 733.
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judicial review of acts of Congress does not support the Court's assertion of a general power to supervise the national legislature. Rather,
that argument, first articulated by Alexander Hamilton in The Federalist Papers29 4 and later adopted by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison,295 implies significant limits on the federal judiciary's power
to review acts of Congress. This argument casts substantial doubt on
the Supreme Court's recent assumption of the power to dictate legislative procedures.
In FederalistNo. 78, Hamilton argued that the judiciary had both
the power and the "duty... to declare all acts contrary to the manifest
tenor of the Constitution void."296 The first proposition in Hamilton's
syllogism was that because "every act of a delegated authority, contrary
to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void,"
"[n] o legislative act... contrary to the Constitution, can be valid."2'97
Chief Justice Marshall started here as well, noting that "all those who
have framed -written constitutions contemplate them as forming the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the
theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legisla'298
ture, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
Of course, as scholars of Chief Justice Marshall's jurisprudence
have observed, the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution over the laws of
Congress was never seriously questioned; rather, doubts aboutjudicial
review concerned which constitutional actors had the power to decide
whether acts of Congress comported with the Constitution. 29 9 Both
Hamilton and Marshall contended that the federal courts necessarily
had that power to the extent that the cases properly before them required a choice between a congressional statute and a conflicting constitutional provision.3 0 0 In such a case, they argued, the Court would
Hamilton).

294

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander

295
296

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

297

Id. at 467.

Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
E.g., Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings ofJudicial
Review: In Defense of TraditionalWsdom, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 329, 426-27 (answering Justice
Marshall's claim that, absent judicial review, a written constitution would be meaningless);
see also, e.g., DAviD P. CURRIE, THE CoNsTUTnION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIir HN.
DRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 71 n.49 (1985) (noting thatJustice Marshall "overstated his case
badly by asserting that judicial review was 'essentially attached to a written constitution'"
(quoting Marbuiy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177)).
300
Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178; THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 296, at 46768. Chief Justice Marshall stated that:
[I]f a law be in opposition to the constitution if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably
to the constitution, disregarding the law the court must determine which of
298
299

these conflicting rules governs the case. This is the very essence ofjudicial
duty.
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be obliged "to be governed by the latter rather than the former.""'
This power to "disregard" a congressional statute when it cannot,
in the Court's independent judgment, be reconciled with the Constitution, neither assumes nor supplies a general authority to insist on
certain congressional procedures, so long as the statute was enacted
pursuant to the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure" set forth in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. 30 2 In
other words, although "[i t is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is,"303 the rationale for
judicial review does not extend so far as to support the Supreme
Court's assertion of a power to say how Congress is to make the law.
Thus, when a case before a court squarely presents a constitutional
question, the court is obliged simply to decide it. The court may not
properly avoid this responsibility by conditioning its adherence to the
statute on congressional compliance with procedural requirements
beyond those set forth in Article I, Section 7.
As a practical matter, then, what is a court to do when confronted
with a statute that may or may not be constitutional depending upon
whether a debatable factual proposition or prediction is correct? Simply put, we believe that the court must, to the best of its ability, determine whether the challenged proposition or judgment is correct. Of
course, precisely how that should be done is a matter fairly open to
debate. At least until the sequence of cases discussed in Part I, the
rule has been that a fact or prediction generally should be considered
"correct," for purposes of constitutional adjudication, so long as Congress would not be irrational or unreasonable to so conclude s " One
might reasonably argue, however, that the responsibility for determining whether a factual predicate to Congress's exercise of its constitutional authority is "correct" should ultimately lie with the courts.
Resolving the question of how facts are to be established in constitutional adjudication, although an important issue, is beyond the scope
of this Article. The critical point here is simply that Article I, Section
7 provides no warrant for a court, including the Supreme Court, to
refuse to enforce a duly enacted statute on the ground that Congress's
formal record does not establish the truth of an underlying congressional conclusion or prediction.

Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
301 THE FEDERAUST No. 78, supra note 296, at 468; see also Marbuw, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at

178 ("IT]he constitution, and not such [an] ordinary act [of Congress], must govern the
case to which they both apply.").
302 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
303 Marbugy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
304 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 613 (1995) (SouterJ., dissenting).
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ConstitutionalLimits on JudicialIntrusion into the Legislative
Sphere

In addition to raising questions under Article I, Section 7, the
Supreme Court's recent treatment of the legislative record in constitutional cases appears inconsistent with the spirit, if not also the letter,
of several constitutional provisions and established jurisprudential
doctrines designed to shelter the federal legislative process from the
threat ofjudicial intrusion. The point here is not to demonstrate that
the Court itself has clearly contravened any one of these provisions or
doctrines, but rather to illustrate that, taken together, they strongly
counsel against the Court's recent enthusiasm for treating the congressional record like an agency record compiled in support of administrative action.
In addition to "vest[ing]" in Congress "[aill legislative Powers
herein granted,"3 0 5 Article I of the Constitution provides that "[e]ach
House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings" 30 6 and "shall keep
a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
30 7
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy."
The Journal Clause directs that "the Yeas and Nays of the Members of
either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those
Present, be entered on the Journal."308 Other than these minimal requirements, the Constitution leaves to Congress's determination the
manner of record to compile in support of legislation.30 9
The Supreme Court has long read the Rules and Journal Clauses
as providing Congress broad discretion to determine how to report
and record its consideration of proposed legislation. 3 10 In Field v.
Clark,3 1 1 the Court considered the argument that what purported to
be a statute enacted by Congress and signed by the President was void
because "the Congressional record of proceedings" allegedly demonstrated that "a section of the bill, as it finally passed, was not in the bill
305
306
307
308

309

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
Id. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
Id. art. I, § 5, cl.3.
Id.
In a remarkable demonstration of Congress's power under these provisions, during

the First Federal Congress, the Senate veiled its proceedings in secrecy and did not make
its journal public until after experience proved that the publication of the proceedings in
the House of Representatives apparently heightened the relative stature of that "other
body." No member of the founding generation appears to have challenged as constitutionally suspect the Senate's original decision to keep secret the record of its proceedings. See
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789-1801, at 10
(1997) ("[T]he Senate chose to operate behind closed doors for several years ....
[N] either chamber interpreted the journal provision [Article I, § 5] to require a verbatim
transcript of its proceedings." (footnote omitted)).
310 See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Field v. Clark, 143 U,S. 649
(1892).
311
143 U.S. 649 (1892).
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authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of Congress, and approved by the President."312 The
Court conceded that the mere fact that a bill had been "signed by the
Speaker of the House . . . and by the President of the Senate,
presented to and approved by the President of the United States" did
not make it a law if the bill "had not in fact been passed by Con-

gress."3 13 The Court, however, rejected the argument that the Journal
Clause made the journals of each house of Congress "the best, if not
conclusive, evidence" as to whether a bill had been passed.3 14 The
Court observed that "[iln regard to certain matters, the Constitution
expressly requires that they shall be entered on the journal,"3s1 but as
to all other matters it was
clear that, in respect to the particular mode in which, or with what
fulness [sic], shall be kept the proceedings of either house ... ;
whether bills, orders, resolutions, reports and amendments shall be
entered at large on the journal, or only referred to and designated
by their titles or by numbers; these and like matters were left to the
316
discretion of the respective houses of Congress.
This conclusion was compelled by "[t]he respect [the courts owed] to
3 17
coequal and independent departments" of the federal government.
Thus, even when a law's very existence was in question, the Court
has declined to impose on Congress the relatively modest requirement that its journals demonstrate that the same text had garnered
approval by both houses. The Court's reluctance to impose such a
requirement on the basis of the minimal requirements of the Journal
Clause and "the respect due to a coordinate branch of the government,"3 18 raises serious doubts about the Court's recent willingness to
disregard an act of Congress merely because the legislative record fails
to evidence a fact that the Court deems an essential predicate to the
constitutionality of the challenged law.
The same day the Court decided Fied, the Court rejected a simi3 19
lar challenge to another federal statute. In United States v. Ballin,
the issue was whether an act of Congress was invalid because of doubt
that a quorum of Members was present when the House of Representatives passed the bill.3 20 When the House considered the bill, only
138 of the 327 Representatives voted in favor of it, while none voted
312

1d. at 668-69.

ss

Id. at 669.

314
315
316
317
318
319
320

Id. at 670.
Id. at 671.
Id
I& at 672.
Id- at 673.
144 U.S. 1 (1892).
Id. at 3-6.
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against it.321 The Speaker of the House had invoked House Rule XV,
which provided that the House could establish a quorum by adding to
the number of members voting the clerk's estimate of the number of
members present in the "hall of the house" but not voting.3 22 The
Supreme Court, while acknowledging that the Rule XV process was
perhaps somewhat untrustworthy, observed that because "[t]he Constitution has prescribed no method of making this determination,...
it is therefore within the competency of the house to prescribe any
32 3
method which shall be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact."
The Court explained:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules
of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the house, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better, more accurate or even
more just.... The power to make rules is... [,] within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
3 24
tribunaL
Like Field, Ballin raises significant questions about the Court's
present inclination to refuse to honor a congressional statute because
of perceived deficiencies in the formal legislative record. In Ballin,
the Court was confronted with the constitutional mandate that "'a ma32
jority of each [house] shall constitute a quorum to do business"' r
and a legitimate challenge to the Speaker's determination that a quorum existed at the time the bill passed the House.3 26 The Court, how3 27
It is, of
ever, refused to second-guess the House's procedures.

course, far more intrusive for the Court to mandate, as in the recent
decisions discussed above, that Congress must either make a formal
evidentiary record supporting its resolution of factual questions ancillary to a constitutional issue, or face the risk that its statutes will be
disregarded by the judiciary.
The commitment to congressional independence reflected in the
Rules and Journal Clauses is even more clearly asserted in Article I,
Section 6, Clause 1, which provides that "for any Speech or Debate in
either House, [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned
321
322
323
324

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.

325

Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting U.S. CONsT. art I, § 5, cl.1).

326
327

Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
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in any other Place."3 28 Though this "Clause... speaks only of 'Speech

or Debate,' ... the [Supreme] Court's consistent approach has been
that to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause to
words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view." 3 - '
Rather, the Court has, "[w]ithout exception,... read the Speech or
Debate Clause broadly to effectuate its purposes."3 3 0 According to the
Court, those purposes are, among others, "to insure that the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be performed
independently," and to "'reinforc[e] the separation of powers so de331
liberately established by the Founders."
The decision in Gravel v. United States33 2 illustrates the wide berth
that the Court has given Congress in Speech or Debate Clause cases.
The facts of Gravelwere rather extreme: the Court confronted Senator
Gravel's invocation of the privilege in response to a federal grand jury
investigation of possible crimes relating to the dissemination of the socalled "Pentagon Papers." 33 3 On June 29, 1971, just four days after a
divided Supreme Court had refused to enjoin publication of portions
of the Pentagon Papers,3 34 Senator Gravel, then the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works
Committee, convened a subcommittee meeting at which he read from
the Pentagon Papers and then placed all forty-seven volumes of the
report in the public record.335 The grand jury subpoenaed Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg, a member of Senator Gravel's staff, to testify about
the meeting. 3 36 Senator Gravel intervened and moved to quash the
subpoena, arguing that its enforcement would violate his rights under
337
the Speech or Debate Clause.
Resisting Senator Gravel's assertion of privilege, the government
asked the district court "to inquire into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting" held on June 29, 1971.3ss The government charac-

terized that meeting as "a special, unauthorized, and untimely
meeting of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works (at midnight
on June 29, 1971), [convened] for the purpose of" dumping the Penart. I, § 6, c. 1.

328

U.S.

329
330

Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972).

331
332

CoNsr.

Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975).
Id. at 502 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966)).
408 U.S. 606 (1972).

Id. at 608-09. The Pentagon Papers consisted of the forty-sevcn volume, classified
Defense Department study entitled "History of the United States Decision-Making Process
on Viet Nam Policy," which was also at the center of the controversy resolved in the much
celebrated New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
334 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 713-14.
335 Grave 408 U.S. at 609.
336 Id. at 608.
333

337
338

Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 610.
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tagon Papers into the public record. 33 9 In answer to the government's
argument that this meeting furthered no legitimate legislative purpose, Senator Gravel asserted that the Pentagon Papers were within
his subcommittee's jurisdiction because "the availability of funds for
the construction and improvement of public buildings and grounds

has been affected by the necessary costs of the war in Vietnam and
that therefore the development and conduct of the war [wa]s prop40
erly within the concern of [the] subcommittee" on public works.3
The district court rejected the government's argument "without detailed consideration of the merits of the Senator's position, on the
basis of the general rule restricting judicial inquiry into matters of leg'3 41
islative purpose and operations.
The Supreme Court agreed, finding it "incontrovertible" that the
Speech or Debate Clause shielded Senator Gravel and his aides "from
criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere than in the
Senate, with respect to the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing."3 42 Indeed, the Court held that, consistent with the Clause,
neither the Senator nor his aides could be questioned about their
preparation for or conduct during that congressional proceeding.3 49
The Court's refusal to second-guess Senator Gravel's highly strained
effort to connect the Pentagon Papers to the work of the subcommittee reflects the extent to which the Court understood the Speech or
Debate Clause to preclude judicial supervision of congressional

proceedings.
The Court's subsequent decision in Eastland v. United States Ser-

vicemen's Fund344 underscores this point. Eastlandgrew out of investigations by the Subcommittee on Internal Security, chaired by Senator
James Eastland, into the extent to which foreign governments had infiltrated domestic organizations in efforts to subvert the United States
government. 345 In the course of its investigations, the subcommittee
inquired into the source of funding for the United States Servicemen's Fund (USSF), a nonprofit corporation committed to serving as
"'the focus of dissent and expressions of opposition within the mili346
tary toward the"' Vietnam War.
The subcommittee subpoenaed bank records relating to USSF,
and in response, the USSF filed a complaint naming as defendants the
Id. at 610 n.6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
341
Id. (quoting district court opinion, United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 935
(Mass. 1971)).
342 Id. at 615.
343 Id. at 628-29.
344 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
339

340

345

Id. at 493.

346

Id. at 494 (quoting the complaint filed by USSF).
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subcommittee, Chairman Eastland, the chief counsel to the subcommittee, and the bank. 347 The complaint sought an injunction forbidding compliance with or enforcement of the subpoena on grounds
that disclosure of the sources of USSF's funding would chin the private contributions on which it depended and infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of the USSF and its individual members to speak
and associate freely.348 The complaint alleged that the subcommittee
had acted in bad faith, seeking merely to expose, harass, and punish
the USSF and its members because of its controversial, antiwar views,
rather than gathering information in support of legitimate legislative
efforts. 349 The trial court denied the requested relief, but the D.C.
Circuit reversed, directing the trial court to fashion a remedy that
would guard the USSF's First Amendment rights against congressional
50
intrusion.A
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Speech or Debate
Clause barred judicial intervention into the Senate's informationgathering processes.3 5 1 The Court reasoned that, given the absolute
nature of the Clause's command that Members of Congress "shall not
be questioned" about their legislative conduct "in any... Place" other
than the House of Congress in which they serve, the sole question for
the courts in USSF's action was whether the defendants' actions fell
"within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity" protected by the
Clause.3 5 2 The Court emphasized that the Speech or Debate Clause
imposed strict limits on judicial assessment of the propriety of legislative procedures because "[tlhe purpose of the Clause is to insure that
the legislative function the Constitution allocates to Congress may be
performed independently."3 5 3 The Clause "protect[s] the integrity of
the legislative process" and "serves the additional function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately established by the Founders."3 54 Even in the context of civil litigation, the Court cautioned,
the judiciary should exercise great restraint when asked to secondguess congressional procedures because judicial intervention risks
"distract[ing]" members from their lawmaking responsibilities and
"divert[ing]" their scarce "time, energy, and attention" away from leg3 55
islative priorities.
347

Id at 494-45.

348

Itt at 495-96.

349

350

Id. at 495.
I& at 497.

351

Id. at 501.

352

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

353
354

Id- at 502.
Id. at 502 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

355

Id. at 503.
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Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Speech or Debate
Clause protected the actions of Senator Eastland's subcommittee.3 5,
The Court held that given the plausible connection between the subcommittee's mandate and the activities of the USSF, the Constitution
barred further judicial inquiry.3 57 The Court rejected as immaterial
the USSF's claim that the true purpose of the subcommittee's investigation was not to inform potential legislation, but rather to punish the
organization's unpopular views, because "in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not look to the motives alleged to

have prompted

it."358

Simply put, "[t]he wisdom of congressional ap-

proach or methodology is not open to judicial veto. '35 9 Thus, even in
the face of credible claims that members were abusing legislative
processes so as to directly infringe core constitutional rights, the

Court has held thatjudicial intrusion into congressional procedures is
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to legislative
independence.
A recent political-question decision, Nixon v. United States,360 further illustrates the constitutional concerns raised by judicial intrusion
into congressional procedures. In Nixon, the Supreme Court addressed the argument of former Chief Judge Nixon of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi that his
impeachment should be set aside because the procedures employed
by the Senate in his case were constitutionally inadequate. 36 1 Specifically, the Senate had opted to take evidence in a hearing before a
special Senate committee, which then reported to the full Senate,
rather than receiving live testimony before the full body.3 62 Nixon
argued that in so doing the Senate had failed to honor its constitutional obligation to "'try' all impeachments." 363 In an opinion by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, however, the Court held that the issue constituted a nonjusticiable political question.3 64
The Court concluded that the Constitution's declaration that
' 3 65
"It]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments
granted the Senate the final word as to what procedures would satisfy
Id. at 507.
Id. at 506-07.
Id. at 508; see also United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (holding that
the Speech or Debate Clause barred a criminal prosecution that challenged as improper
the defendant congressman's motives for making a speech on the floor of the House of
Representatives).
359 Eastland,421 U.S. at 509.
356

357
358

360
361

506 U.S. 224 (1993).
Id. at 228.

362

Id.

363

Id. at 228.

364
365

Id. at 236.
U.S. CONsr.art. I,

§ 3, cl. 6.

2001]

REMANDING TO CONGRESS

that obligation, thus excluding the judiciary from any role in this determination. 3 66 En route to this conclusion, the Court rejected
Nixon's straightforward textual argument that by placing the "sole"
power to "try" impeachments in the "Senate," the Constitution precluded the Senate from delegating to a committee the task of hearing
evidence.3 67 Indeed, the Court embraced the government's argument
against justiciability notwithstanding the government's concession at
oral argument that its position would equally barjudicial review if the
Senate were to dispense with evidentiary proceedings altogether and
move directly to a vote on guilt or innocencest3
According to the Court, evidence that the Founders quite deliberately divided the impeachment power between the House and the
Senate, rejecting proposals to vest the power in thejudiciary.3 69 when
combined with the "[r]espect [due] a coordinate branch of the Government,"3 70 compelled the conclusion that the courts were constitutionally prohibited from second-guessing the Senate's choice of
impeachment procedures. 3 71 Thus, the political question doctrine as
articulated and applied in Nxon, like the Rules Clause, Journal
Clause, and Speech or Debate Clause cases, reflects the Constitution's
commitment to protecting congressional processes from judicial
manipulation.
3.

The PoliticalRealities of CongressionalProcedures

We have argued above that the Court's recent decisions attaching
increasing significance to perceived gaps in the formal legislative record contravene both prior precedent and the fundamental constitutional value of legislative independence. We also believe that the
Court premises its new approach on two false assumptions about congressional procedures.
First, in Fores, Florida Prepaid, and Kinel the Court appears to
have assumed that the formal legislative record reflects all the information properly cognizable by Congress. In fact, however, members

of Congress have from the institution's inception properly relied on a
variety of sources not reflected in the legislative record. Moreover, in
the last thirty years the number and quality of these extra-record
sources have increased significantly. The Court's failure to acknowledge these sources has, not surprisingly, resulted in decisions characterized by an impoverished appreciation of the legislative process.
366
367
368
369
370
371

Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226, 238.
IH. at 229, 232.
See id at 239 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).

Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 234.
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Second, the Court's recent decisions also rest on the false premise that congressional committee hearings, like the proceedings of a
trial court or an administrative agency, serve the sole purpose of educating a neutral but uninformed tribunal of the facts central to its
decision-making responsibilities. That one function served by congressional committee hearings is to inform Congress's legislative judgments cannot be denied. But it must also be recognized that
congressional committee hearings are self-consciously orchestrated to
serve other legitimate purposes as well: gauging the political benefits
and risks of a specific legislative proposal and informing, shaping, and
directing public discourse on matters of national concern, among
others. By imposing on Congress the duty to create a record designed
to facilitate searching judicial review of Congress's factual conclusions,
the Court threatens to limit the other legitimate purposes served by
congressional proceedings. In particular, if Congress heeds the message sent by the Court's recent decisions, the Court's approach will
likely have the undesirable consequence of diverting scarce congressional resources away from the political and public-informing functions that committee hearings currently serve in order to satisfy the
judiciary's increasingly rigorous demands of the legislative record.
a. Extra-Record Sources of Information
In Flores, FloridaPrepaid, and Kimel, the Court assumed that the
formal legislative record of the three challenged statutes reflected all
the facts supporting Congress's judgments. 372 This assumption ignores those sources of information available to Congress that a statute's legislative history does not reflect. First, and most significantly,
representative government is premised on the belief that members of
Congress, acting as representatives of their constituents, bring to the
372

In Thores, the Court inferred that unconstitutional religious discrimination was all

but nonexistent in the United States from the fact that the congressional committee hearings on RFRA identified no recent instances of"generally applicable laws passed because of

religious bigotry." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). For a contrary view
on the present extent of unconstitutional religious discrimination, see Laycock, supra note
242, at 771-80. The Court made a similar leap in FloridaPrepaid,when it reasoned that a
paucity of evidence on the formal legislative record demonstrated that unconstitutional
state patent infringement was too rare to justify Congress's express invocation of its power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645-47 (1999). Finally, in Kine, because the formal legisla.
tive history of the ADEA lacked extensive documentation of age discrimination by states,
the Court concluded that "Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local
governments were unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis
of age." Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 649 (2000). In each of these cases, the
Court ignored the possibility that Congress's judgments were likely informed in ways not
reflected in the formal legislative record.
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legislature those constituents' views on the seriousness of perceived
national problems and the appropriateness of a federal solution.37 3
During the ratification debates for the Constitution in 1787,
among the most divisive of issues was whether the proposed House of
Representatives was sufficiently numerous to represent adequately the
diverse interests of all United States citizens.3 74 Both Federalists and
Antifederalists were in accord, however, that "[i]t is a sound and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with
the interests and circumstances of his constituents."3 7 r Of course, our
commitment to this principle of representative government is as firm
today as it was at the time of the founding.37 6 Accordingly, unlike a

judicial trier of fact or an administrative law judge, Congress is not a
tabula rasauntil it conducts on-the-record proceedings. Rather, members of Congress are expected to act in large part according to the
views of their constituents, which the members bring to the institution. Congress grounds its claim to legitimacy on knowledge of and
accountability to the citizens it represents, not on an assertion of neutrality or technical expertise.
In addition to whatever knowledge members of Congress bring
with them from their home states or districts, Congress properly relies
on a wide range of information-gathering methods not reflected in
the formal legislative record. Key legislators' ex parle communications
373 See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:The Rok of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National GovernmenA 54 Cow.-Ut. L Rnv. 543, 547 (1954) (arguing that the "local sensitiity... cannot fail to find reflection in the Congress").
374
1 THE FouNDEas' CoNsTrrutmoN 386 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
(stating that "[e]clipsing all [other] controversies and concerns" about the nature of representation under the proposed Constitution "%as the issue of an adequate representation as
expressed in the size of the proposed House of Representatives"). Sce generallyTim FE.R.
Asr No. 55 (James Madison) (responding to concern that the number of members to
serve in the proposed House of Representatives was too small to permit adequate
representation).
375
TuE FDAus r No. 56, at 346 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); se
also 1 MAx FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERA. Co.vamcrno- 132-33 (Yale rev. ed. 1937)
(statement ofJames Wilson) ("The Gov. ought to possess not only Ist. the force but 2ndly.
the mind or sense of the people at large." (emphasis in original)); 1 THE FoL.NDERS' Coxsr.
"uTION, supra note 374, at 409 (statement of George Mason at Virginia Rati1fing Convention) ("To make representation real and actual, the number of Representatives ought to
be adequate; they ought to mix ith the people, think as they think, feel as they feel, ought

to be perfectly amendable to them, and thoroughly acquainted
condition.").

with their interest and

376
See Wnu. J. KEEFE & MoRms S. OcuL, THE AMERI CN LEGIsLVrTnE PRocEss 67
(9th ed. 1997) ("No tenets of democratic theory are grounded more firmly in American
political thought and practice than that legislators are expected to look steadily to the
people who elect them, to seek out their opinions, to speak their convictions and uncertainties, to express their values, [and] to protect their interests."); see alsoTheodoreJ. Lowi,
Toward a Legislature of the irstKind, in KNowLEDGE, POIV.R, AND rihE CONGRESS 9, 12, 16-17
(William H. Robinson & Clay H. Welbom eds., 1991) (stressing the role that"amateur" or
.constituency" knowledge properly plays in the legislative process).
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with interest groups educate Congress as to the need for and wisdom
of potential legislation.3 7 7 Of course, absent circumstances indicating
corruption or bribery, these kinds of off-the-record communications
are not only legally permissible, but constitutionally protected.3 7 8 Observers of Congress recognize that these informal discussions often
have far greater influence on Congress's judgments than on-the-record proceedings, such as committee hearings.3 7 9 Moreover, in the
last thirty years Congress has greatly enhanced the information support services available to individual members by dramatically increasing the number of both committee and personal staff serving the
institution, many of whom bring to their capitol-hill service specialized
knowledge relevant to issues of public policy and develop even greater

377

See KEErz & OGUL, supra note 376, at 327-28 ("Nearly two-thirds of the lobbyists

believe that the most effective tactic involves the personal presentation of their case. Testi.
fying before hearings... is ranked somewhat lower than personal contact with a single
person."); LEROY N. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL PoLIIcs: THE EVOLVING LEGISLATIVE SYS.
TEM236-38 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the significance of exparte meetings between lobbyists

and members of Congress); Louis Sandy Maisel, CongressionalInfonation Sources, in TtIL
HOUSE AT WORK 247, 255-56 (Joseph Cooper & G. Calvin Mackenzie eds., 1981) (discussing
the role lobbyists play in supplying information in both formal, on-the-record settings and
informal, private meetings with representatives or their staff); Allen Schick, Informed Legislation: Policy Research Versus Ordinary Knowledge, in KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND rnE CONGRmSS,
supra note 376, at 99, 99 (stating that information flows into Congress from "diverse
sources [including] ... constituent complaints or requests for assistance... [and] meetings with lobbyists or others who have privileged access"). For a colorful, and somewhat
disparaging, account of one lobbyist's off-the-record influence, see THoAs B. CURTIS &
DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 14-15 (1992).
378 See WLLiAM N. ESKRIDGE,JR. & PHILIP P. FuCR:EY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEciIStATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC Poucy 292 (2d. ed. 1995) (noting that the
"Speech" and "Petition" Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
presumptively protect legitimate communications concerning matters of public policy between elected representatives and their constituents). In the few instances in which the
Court has acknowledged the existence of communications from constituents on matters of
public concern, the Court has trivialized these communications as a potential source for
Congress's ultimate judgments. See, e.g., Kimel v, Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 649

(2000) (dismissing as inconsequential the floor statements of Senator Bentsen made in
reliance on letters from his constituents reporting age discrimination by state or local
governments).
379
E.g., WALTERJ. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROcESS 66
(1978) (stating that although "[oistensibly, hearings are important primarily as fact-finding
instruments," in reality "[m]uch ... information.., is available to committee members
long before the hearings take place" and "members [of Congress] often have strong partisan positions on the legislation and thus may have little interest in whatever additional
information emerges from the hearings"); CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTiCE AND
PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATivE GUIDE 150 (1989) (observing that
"[a] much-mooted point is how much the content of hearings matters" and that
"[s]ometimes the record created has minimal importance, since committees can find out
through informal means where the key players stand, and the hearing may merely observe
the formalities and allow interested persons to 'blow off steam'"). Nevertheless, for other
reasons, committee hearings indisputably play a vital role in the legislative process. Ii7fra
Part II.B.3(b).
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expertise during their tenure.sO Congress has simultaneously supplied itself two new support agencies, the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Budget Office, and has significantly
upgraded two preexisting ones, the General Accounting Office and
the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.-"'
Each of these entities is charged with, among other things, providing
accurate, nonpartisan information to congressional committees and
individual members upon requestss 2 The information supplied by
these entities to Congress frequently does not appear in the formal
legislative record.
In sum, the formal legislative history of a statute reflects at best a
small portion of the information on which members of Congress may
legitimately rely in voting on a bill. This reality of congressional procedures conflicts with the Supreme Court's recent willingness to infer
from silence in the legislative record that a problem that Congress
identifies as significant does not warrant a federal response.
b.

The Informing Function of Congress

The availability of off-the-record informational resources does
not, of course, alter the fact that committee hearings are among the
most important aspects of the legislative process. Such hearings are
significant partially because of what is ostensibly their primary purpose-to inform the members of the committee as to the need for or
wisdom of proposed legislation.3 8 3 More often, however, committee
hearings are intended to inform the public, rather than Congress.
Over one hundred years ago, Woodrow Wilson, then an aspiring academic, concluded in his now famous study of congressional government that "[t]he informing function of Congress should be preferred
even to its legislative function."M4 The future President explained
that "even more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body
which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of dis380
See KE E & OGUL, supranote 376, at 35-36,193-95 (discussing increase in the quantity and quality of personal and committee staff); R ANm. B. PRPLE; CO.NGPRss: Pnocss
AN Pouc" 250 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing legislative impact of increase in the numbers of
personal and committee staff).
381 See RneLEz,supra note 380, at 250.
382
See id at 250-52.
383
SeeTiEs-R, supra note 379, at 150 (noting that in 1965, during congressional consideration of Medicare legislation, hearing testimony by representatives of the American Medical Association had a dramatic, albeit unintended, impact on the views of members of the
House Ways and Means Committee).
384 WOODROW WILSON, CONGRSIONAL GovERN.%
IEuNA STuDm IN A.%tEsc . PoLITIcs
198 (Meridian 1973) (1885).
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cussion."385 In President Wilson's estimation, Congress exists not
merely to execute public opinion, but also to shape it.386
Although Wilson urged Congress to focus even greater efforts on
informing the public,

3 87

the institution has, throughout its history,

substantially dedicated its public proceedings to this end. Indeed,
even at the nadir of congressional investigations (during the now infamously overzealous McCarthy Era investigations), the Supreme Court
recognized that Congress had always "performed an 'informing function."'38 8 More recently, diverse authorities have acknowledged the
important, although perhaps under-appreciated, role that Congress's
informing function plays in shaping public opinion and in animating
desired reforms.3 8 9 As then-Senator Al Gore explained in 1986, "[i] n
many areas, the most important missing ingredient is attention," not
legislation, "and an elevated awareness of the problem can be a very
successful outcome of the hearings."3 9 0
The Supreme Court's recently reinvigorated scrutiny of the formal legislative record in constitutional cases threatens to undermine
the informing function of congressional committee hearings. As
when Wilson first published his study, Congressional Government, time
and resource limits still prevent Congress from entirely fulfilling its
public-informing potential.3 9 1 To the extent that Congress responds
385
386

Id. at 195.
Id. at 198; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Reviva4 97 YALE LJ. 1539,

1549 (1988) (noting that republican political theory would support "attempt[s] to design
political institutions that promote discussion and debate among the citizenry").
387 WItsoN, supra note 384, at 195-98.
388 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957); see also Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 650 (1972) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("Congressional hearings... are
not confined to gathering information for internal distribution, but are often widely publicized, sometimes televised, as a means of alerting the electorate to matters of public import
and concern.").
889
E.g., KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 376, at 29 (discussing "the extraordinary opportunities" congressional committee investigations "offer for influencing public opinion"); OLIs.
zEK, supra note 379, at 68 (noting that investigative hearings inform public opinion);
Samuel Dash, Congress' Spotlight on the Oval Office: The Senate Watergate Hearings,18 NovA L.
Rxv. 1719, 1723 (1994) (discussing the "tremendous impact" the Senate Watergate hearings had on public opinion about the Nixon administration, in particular, and American
government, more generally); Sam Nunn, The Impact of the Senate PermanentSubcommittee on
Investigationson FederalPolicy, 21 GA. L. REv. 17, 18 (1986) ("Congress... must inform the
public, as well as itself."); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Introductionto CONGREss INVESTIGArES:
1792-1974, at xi, xii (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975) ("The investigative power may indeed be the sharpest legislative weapon against Executive
aggrandizement.").
390 Alan L. Otten, Sen. Albert Gore Gains Political Clout With Unlikely Issues Such as
Bioethics, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 54; see also KEE & OGUL, supra note 376, at 29
(noting that "publicity by itself may lead to the correcting of abuses, thereby allaying the
need for legislation").
391 KEEFE & OGUL, supra note 376, at 28-30 (discussing the pressures on legislative bodies that diminish their capacity to serve an educative function).
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to the Court's recent decisions, it may increasingly divert its limited

resources to the creation of a record designed to satisfy the Court.392
m
JuDICIAL REVIEW AT THE

LiNrs

OF

CONGRESSIONAL AuTHoRT

Thus far, we have argued that a number of the Court's recent
constitutional decisions impose heightened requirements on Congress to make factual findings and compile a factual record to justify
legislation near the margins of its constitutional authority. We have
also suggested that this trend is both problematic under the Court's
own precedents and constitutionally and practically suspect. In this
final Part of the Article, we move from identifying doctrinalobjections
to this development, to briefly considering the broader jurisprudential
questions it raises. In particular, we anticipate the rejoinder that the
Court's recent approach can be justified as a necessary means to the
legitimate end of keeping Congress within constitutional limits, notwithstanding the legal objections set forth above.3 93 On this view,
Congress will not, absent searching judicial review, conscientiously
honor the constitutional restraints on its authority. Thus, the Court's
emerging requirement that Congress compile an extensive record in
support of statutes at the margins of its authority is to be lauded, the
objections outlined above notwithstanding, because it is a means by
which the Court can enforce the Constitution's commands. Part HIA
explains why we reject this argument, although we certainly recognize
its appeal. Part Il.B then discusses alternate approaches to the per392 These two goals, informing the public and satisfying the Court, will often pull congressional committees in opposite directions. To take an obvious example, Congress often
orchestrates congressional committee hearings to "put a human face" on an otherise abstract issue. By focusing on compelling individual instances of a more general problem,
congressional committees properly seek to direct public attention to neglected matters. See
OL.szEs, supra note 379, at 68. The Court, however, has discounted such evidence, dis-

missing it as merely "anecdotal." City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997)
(noting that "[m]uch of the discussion" at the congressional committee hearings on RFRA
"centered upon anecdotal evidence" and thus failed to demonstrate a "widespread pattern
of religious discrimination in this country"); see also, eg., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S.
Ct. 631, 649 (2000) (dismissing as insignificant evidence of individual instances ofstate age
discrimination); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 640 (1999) (criticizing the House Report prepared in support of the Patent Remedy
Act on the ground that it identified only two examples of patent infringement suits against
the States).
393

Significantly, this argument is not one that the Court itself has advanced. Indeed,

as the discussion of the recent decisions in Part I makes clear, the Court has not only failed
to offer any explanation for the fundamental shift in the nature of its review of the legislative record in dose constitutional cases, but has also failed even to acknowledge that there
is change afoot. Nonetheless, this possible apology for the Court's approach is a serious
one and merits consideration.

390

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:328

ceived problem of congressional lawlessness that do not entail the
same risk of judicial aggrandizement.
A.

Is the Court's Recent Approach Necessary to Restrain
Congress?

Many scholars have forcefully argued that, under the pre-Lapez
Commerce Clause and the pre-Flores Section 5 case law, Congress's
affirmative powers under these provisions were not subject to meaningful judicial restraint.394 Moreover, Congress arguably has shown
little self-restraint in the exercise of this unchecked authority. Given
this history, some scholars have advocated heightened judicial scrutiny
of Congress's conclusions that a perceived problem requires a federal
legislative response. 3 95 Indeed, perhaps the most forceful justification
394
There is abundant commentary to this effect insofar as the Commerce Clause is
concerned. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 Micm. L. REv. 752, 752 (1995) (describing the Court as
"being 'asleep at the constitutional switch' for [the] more than fifty years" that elapsed
between the decisions upholding New Deal legislation and Lopez (citation omitted)); Lino
A. Graglia, United States v. Lopez: JudicialReview Under the Commerce Clause, 74 TEx. L. RL-v.
719, 746 (1996) (concluding that since the New Deal, "the Court had engaged in only
pretend review" under the Commerce Clause); James M. McGoldrick, Katzenbach v. McClung- The Abandonment of Federalism in the Name of Rational Basis, 14 BYU J. Pvn. L. 1, 5
(1999) (arguing that after the Court extended the rational-basis test to Commerce Clause
review in McClung,the Court was no longer significantly involved in policing the boundaries of congressional power under that Clause); Moulton, supra note 64, at 889 (observing
that "[b] efore Lope; most commentators had come to the conclusion that Congress had a
free hand in deciding what counts as 'commerce among the states.'" (citation omitted));
Grant S. Nelson & RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: ApplyingIFirstPrinci.
ples to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but PreserveState Controlover Social Issues, 85 IoWA
L. REv. 1, 6 (1999) (noting that the Court's post-1936 Commerce Clause case law failed to
"establish any concrete limits on Congress"); cf.Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mfast: Democracy,
Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of the Seventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rav. 500, 561
(1997) (arguing that following the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, "Congress,
determined to lead, . . . wrested the whip handle from the states and found itself
unrestrained").
Commentators have made the same point with respect to the Court's pre-'Tores construction of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., GREvE,
supra note 118, at 35 ("[T]he pre-/ores caselaw teaches that judges should refrain from
second-guessing congressional responses to perceived problems of discrimination .... .);
Laycock, supra note 242, at 747 (stating that "from 1866 to 1991, Congress repeatedly enacted enforcement legislation that went beyond judicial interpretations of the constitutional right being enforced," and that "most of these Acts were upheld or accepted into the
fabric of the law without serious challenge").
395
Calabresi, supra note 394, at 799-811 (arguing for heightened judicial review);
Gardbaum, supra note 11, at 799 (arguing for "policing Congress's deliberative processes
and its reasons for regulating"); Jackson, supra note 11, at 2240 (arguing that "requiring
Congress... to justify the basis for federal regulation in areas not previously regulated at
the federal level and not obviously within an enumerated power... may help it do its job
better by forcing it to be more thoughtful about whether a national law is the appropriate
solution"); Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of
Rights, 84 IowA L. REv. 941,947 (1999) (arguing for an abandonment ofjudicial deference
to factual judgments made by legislators).
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for heightened judicial scrutiny of Congress's factual conclusions
bearing on the constitutional limits of its authority is that, absent
searching judicial inquiry, Congress would be left the judge of its own
limitations.396 This argument is formidable, especially in light of the
all too palpable sense that Congress has in recent decades failed to
3 97
honor faithfully the constitutional limits on its authority.
Nevertheless this argument cannot justify the Court's recent approach because intractable problems of competency, legitimacy, and
manipulability inevitably accompany it. Regarding competency, there
can be little doubt that federal judges, and particularly appellate court
judges, are singularly ill suited to make the kinds of factual determinations and predictive judgments that must be made in assessing
whether legislation answers a real, rather than merely perceived, national problem. Yet that is essentially what the Court's recent cases

entail. When five or more justices are skeptical about the factual basis

for congressional action, the Court will strike the challenged statute
down, citing deficiencies in the legislative record as the act's constitutional infirmity. When, however, a majority of the Court perceives a
problem meriting a congressional response, the challenged statute

will be upheld, regardless of whether Congress compiled a thorough
record when enacting the law. Thus, although the Court's new approach ostensibly turns on a procedural judgment about the state of
the record, rather than a substantive one about the need for the legislation, it is the Court's own skepticism about the underlying facts that
triggers the "procedural" requirement of a developed record in the
first place. In our view, however, the judiciary is ill equipped to rule

396 Indeed, much of the rhetorical appeal of the Supreme Court decisions in Lope-,
l/ores,ToridaPrepai4and Kimel can be traced to the fear that the government's arguments
in support of the challenged statutes would release Congress from any meaningful consti-

tutional restraint. Eg., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995), superradedby statute as stated in United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999). Yet, as noted, supra
note 393, the Court itself has not even acknowledged its recent shift toward more intensive
scrutiny of the legislative record, let alone affirmatively advanced the need to keep Congress within constitutional bounds as a justification for its new approach.
397 It might also be argued that if the need to keep Congress in check exists, the
Court's essentially procedural focus on the state of the legislative record is an especially
appropriate way to do so. In particular, this approach might, albeit in a somewhat counterintuitive fashion, help to /imitjudicial intrusion into legislative prerogatives, because it
leaves open the possibility that the same statute found impermissible in one case might be
upheld in the next if supported by evidence that a truly national problem exists. See
Gardbaum, supranote 11, at 830-31;Jackson, supra note 11, at 2237; Lessig, supra note 11,
at 207. This understanding of the Court's recent decisions may find support in its much
earlier decisions in H! v. Wlla//ar4 259 U.S. 44 (1922), and Boardof Tradeof Chdtago v. Oen,
262 U.S. 1 (1923). See supra notes 172-90 and accompanying text. So understood, the
recent decisions, like Hi, indicate the Court's willingness for Congress to educate it about
the relationship between the problem the challenged statute targets and the power Congress had invoked when enacting it.
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on whether factual determinations and predictive judgments should
be considered "suspect."

398

Moreover, even if competency could be established, questions
concerning the constitutional legitimacy ofjudges making such determinations would need to be frankly addressed. Judgments relating to
the need for legislation are often inherently value-laden, and thus inevitably political.3 99 Consigning such political judgments to the
unelected federal judiciary would appear inconsistent with the structural framework of our Constitution. 40 0 Finally, proponents of heightened scrutiny of the legislative record as a check on the bounds of
Congress's legislative authority would need to consider whether this
approach would supply judicially manageable standards to govern fu-

ture controversies. 40 1 Such a fact-intensive approach creates a significant risk that federal judges will decide cases based on their own
predilections, rather than any articulable, neutral principles.

402

Al-

though a highly manipulable fact-based approach to review of congressional enactments would retain maximum flexibility for the
Supreme Court, such unbridled discretion would clearly be subject to
judicial abuse. 40 3 In the long run, a fact-based approach to judicial
398 But cf.Peggy C. Davis, "There Is a Book Out... ": An Analysis ofJudidal Absorption of
LegislativeFacts, 100 HARv. L. Rav. 1539, 1602-03 (1987) (footnote omitted from title) (arguing for codification of the courts' authority to notice disputed legislative facts); Kenneth
L. Karst, LegislativeFactsin ConstitutionalLitigation,1960 Sup. CT.Rav. 75, 110. One might
also question whether an appellate court's doubts about the factual predicate for a challenged statute should result in invalidation of the statute, as in Lopez, Flores,FloridaPepaid,
and Kirae4 as opposed to a remand for further development of the judicial record, as in
TurnerI. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. When reasonable persons could disagree as to the factual assumptions underlying Congress's decision to legislate, one would at
least expect an appellate court to develop the judicial record on the point in dispute.
399
See Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking theJudicialReception of LegislativeFacts,41 VANO. L.
REv. 111, 123-24 (1988).
400
See Moulton, supra note 64, at 916 (contending that "[t]
o grantjudges the responsibility for undoing congressional ... decisions based on federalism values or an alternate
view of the facts is to invite the bald substitution ofjudicial preferences for the judgments
of elected officials"); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 666 (1994)
(plurality opinion) (holding that courts do not have the authority "to replace Congress'
factual predictions").
401
Kropf, supranote 83, at 373-74 (arguing that the Lopez decision was highly ambigu
ous and provided insufficient guidance to the lower courts).
402 A highly discretionary federalism doctrine, for example, might well lead to the perception, if not also the reality, that federal judges manipulate the doctrine in order to
legislate from the bench. To illustrate, some of Congress's most out spoken champions of
federalism have recently advanced bills banning so-called partial-birth abortions and physician-assisted suicide. See Michael Grunwald, In Legislative Tide, StatePowerEbbs:Federalization
Has Few Friends but Many Votes, WASH. Posr, Oct. 24, 1999, at Al. So too, federal judges
called upon to review a statute on such a controversial subject might, like their colleagues
in Congress, allow their views on the merits of the issue to color their federalism analysis.
403
Cross, supra note 61, at 1306 (arguing that "judicial review of the basis for legislation ... would not consistently advance the objectives of federalism but would merely
enable judges to strike down occasional laws in order to better effect their ideological
policy objectives"); cf.Lessig, supra note 11, at 174-75 (noting that the Court's need to
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review of the limits on Congress's power may, therefore, be more intrusive than simply ruling that Congress may not reach certain subjects under its Commerce Clause or Section 5 powers. In addition,
the indeterminacy of such an approach may ultimately exhaust the
Court's "institutional capital" and undermine the legitimacy of the
40 4
federal judiciary.
These objections strongly counsel against heightened judicial
scrutiny of Congress's conclusions that problems merit federal legislative solutions. Of course, the question then becomes whether some
alternative approach would be better suited to keeping Congress
within constitutional limits and more compatible with judicial legitimacy and competence. Plenary consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this Article, which focuses on describing and
questioning the Court's evolving treatment of the legislative record in
constitutional cases. Nevertheless, we briefly discuss two possible approaches and identify promising scholarship that explores the relative
advantages and disadvantages of each.
B. Alternatives
If,as we contend, heightened judicial scrutiny of the legislative
record is the wrong answer to the admittedly serious danger of congressional overreaching, the question remains: What, if anything, may
the Court legitimately do to confine Congress to meaningful limits?
First, and perhaps most obviously, the ultimate answer may be "very
little." The Court's position in our constitutional order, properly understood, may simply preclude aggressive judicial efforts to police the
boundaries of the Constitution's affirmative grants of power to Congress. Certainly, many scholars have drawn precisely that conclusion
from the Court's ultimate acquiescence to the New Deal Congress's
expansive understanding of the Commerce Clause.40 Moreover, opretain the appearance of impartiality requires that it adopt rules that will not be perceived
as being manipulable).
404 SeeJassE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NAnomL Pou-rcu.. Ptocass: A
FuxcnoNAL CONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPRE!% COURT 169 (1980); see alto Woolhandler, supranote 399, at 121 (arguing that "[f]ormalizing the process forjudidal reception of legislative facts" will increase "the influence of pragmatic balancing in judicial

decisionmaking," which will in turn "make thejudicial process look more like the legislarive and administrative processes" and thus "undermine the legitimacy of the courts").
405 Eg., Cross, supranote 61, at 1320 (stating that the Court "has a strong incentive not

to hamstring the exercise of federal power generally and little incentive to establish a
strong, principled, consistently enforceable doctrine of federalism"); William N.Eskridge,
Jr. &John Ferejohn, The ElasticCommerce Clause. A PoliticalThyo
9y ofAmerican Federalism,47
VANn. L.Rxv. 1355, 1359 (1994) (arguing that "because the Court is politically vulnerable
to Congress and the President, it has rarely attempted to construe the Commerce Clause to
limit congressional authority"); Graglia, supra note 394, at 770 (arguing that "adirect confrontation with Congress over the scope of federal legislative authority is a battle the Court
cannot win").
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ponents of vigorous judicial review of statutes at the margins of Congress's power have insisted that the "political safeguards of federalism"
built into our constitutional architecture sufficiently protect the divi40 6
sion of authority between the national and the state governments,
even though we recognize that this view has, in turn, been criticized as
both unrealistic 40 7 and contrary to the founders' intent.40 8 More recently, scholars who are less sanguine about Congress's ability to exercise self-restraint have, nevertheless, concluded that the dangers of

aggressive judicial efforts to enforce the constitutional limits on Con-

40 9
gress's authority far outweigh those of a more passive approach.
Not surprisingly, however, a wide array of critics from the time of the
New Deal to the present have attacked the argument for judicial re410
straint as leading instead to complete judicial abdication.
To avoid the pitfalls of, on the one hand, second-guessing Congress's inherently value-laden factual judgments and, on the other
hand, an approach that eliminates any meaningful judicial role in restraining Congress, the Court must do something that it has struggled,
and failed, to do for most of the twentieth century: articulate workable
substantive legal standards by which Congress's more aggressive assertions of power may be impartially assessed. 4 11 Morrison's tentative sug-

E.g., CHOPER, supra note 404, at 175 ("The federal judiciary should not decide con.
stitutional questions respecting the ultimate power of the national government vis-..vis the
states; rather, the... issue... should be treated as nonjusticiable, final resolution being
relegated to the political branches-i.e., Congress and the President."); Wechsler, supra
note 373, at 546 ("[T he existence of the states as governmental entities and as the sources
of the standing law is in itself the prime determinant of our working federalism.").
407 Moulton, supranote 64, at 912 (arguing that the political safeguards model "affords
[the states] little protection from intrusive national legislation"). But see Larry D. Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back into the PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism, 100 COLuM. L. RLv. 215
(2000) (arguing that party politics secure federalism values).
408 John C. Yoo, Sounds ofSovereignty: Defining Federalismin the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REv. 27,
39 (1998) ("The founding generation feared that Congress would seek to grab more power
from the states in order to enhance its own institutional power, prestige, and glory.").
409 Cross, supra note 61, at 1335; Graglia, supra note 394, at 769-70; Moulton, supra
406

note 64, at 852.
410 E.g., Calabresi, supranote 394, at 752 (arguing that the Court has been "'asleep at
the constitutional switch'" (quoting Expansion Checked, WA.L ST.J., Apr. 27, 1995, at A14));
Edward S. Corwin, The Passingof Dual Federalism,36 VA. L. Rxv. 1, 23 (1950).
411 As a practical matter, the Court's recent focus on perceived deficiencies in the
formal legislative record may have followed from a lack of consensus among the justices in
the majority as to the legal rationale for an agreed upon result. All the cases discussed in
Part I presented difficult legal questions in areas of constitutional law, characterized by
both a bitter history, and deep, yet unstable, divisions on the current Court. In the Turner
cases, the question was the substantiality of the government interest necessary to justify
content-neutral economic regulation imposing a burden on speech. Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63 (1994) ("Turner I"); Turner Broad. Sys,, Inc. v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180, 189-90 (1997) ("Turner II"). In Lopez, the question was the scope of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate noncommercial intrastate activity with
some nonnegligible impact on interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559-61 (1995), superceded by statute as stated in United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th
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gestion of a reformulated legal standard for the resolution of
Commerce Clause cases may prove to be a step in the right direction,
although we presently take no position on the wisdom of the majority's distinction between economic and noneconomic causes of substantial effects on interstate commerce. 4 12 The Court's decisions in
the Turner cases, as well as in Lopez and Flores, have also inspired commentators to offer some promising proposals. 4 13 Advocates for active
judicial constraint of congressional overreaching should focus their

efforts on refining and advancing these proposals. This focus would
allow them to acknowledge the judicial usurpation threatened by the
Court's recent heightened scrutiny of the formal legislative record,
without abandoning hope that the Court might play a constructive
role in keeping Congress within constitutional limits.
CONCLUSION

In a series of recent cases, the Supreme Court has become increasingly aggressive in striking down federal statutes because Congress's formal legislative record inadequately supports factual findings
or predictions underlying congressional action. In so doing, the
Court has placed new procedural burdens on Congress to compile an
extensive legislative record in support of statutes approaching the
boundaries of the legislature's constitutional authority, much as federal agencies are required to compile a record in support of administrative action.
This emerging procedural requirement is highly questionable on
precedential, constitutional, and practical grounds. Congress is not an
Cir. 1999). In Kom, RFoddaPrepaid,and K/m4 the issue was the extent of Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact prophylactic measures. Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 644 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 638-40 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517
(1997).
In each case, the Court's ostensible focus on perceived inadequacies in the formal
legislative record may well have been a convenient means to reach a desired result, i'ithout
definitively resolving a difficult legal question that risked fracturing the majority. Of
course, even intractable disputes among the Justices do notjustif, resort to a legally and
jurisprudentially unsound approach tojudicial review.
412 United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2000). Notably, in their Mordson
dissents, Justices Souter and Breyer raise serious questions about the theoretical validity
and workability of the majority's statement regarding the governing legal standard. Id. at
1764-65 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 1774 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
413 E.g, Ann Althouse, EnfordngFederalinnAfterUnited States v. Lopez, 38 Aiz. L R%.
793, 794 (1996) (arguing for a Commerce Clause analysis that takes into account "the
positive value of state and local government, the best uses of federal power, and the ideal
allocation of cases between the state and federal courts"); Nelson & Pushaw, supra note
394, at 9-13 (proposing that the Court adopt a new definition of te term "commerce");
Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally RL'ite
United States v. Lopez, 94 MiCH. L Ray. 554, 555-59 (1995) (suggesting a revised Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
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agency, and, until recently, it was well established that the constitutionality of federal statutes did not depend on formal findings supported by record evidence, at least outside of the narrow categories of
laws subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny. Moreover, the Court's
imposition of new, procedural conditions on Congress's exercise of its
legislative authority raises substantial constitutional questions under
the Rules and Journal Clauses, the Speech or Debate Clause, and the
political question doctrine. Finally, the Court's new approach is simply inconsistent with the political realities of congressional factfinding.
Some might, nevertheless, forcefully defend the Court's recent
approach as justified by the need to keep Congress within constitutional boundaries. Upon reflection, however, doubts about the limits
of the courts' competence and legitimacy lead us to conclude that
heightened judicial scrutiny of the factual basis for congressional action is inconsistent with the proper role of the federal judiciary. Accordingly, advocates of more aggressive judicial review of federal
statutes at the margins of Congress's constitutional authority cannot
avoid the hard question that has perplexed the Court for much of the
twentieth century: Can the Court articulate legalstandards that will, on
the one hand, allow for federal legislation necessary to govern an integrated national economy and protect individual liberties from state
intrusion, and, on the other hand, preserve the Constitution's intended balance between federal and state governments? It is this
question, not factual questions concerning the extent of the problems
particular federal statutes address, that interested commentators
should consider, and that the Court must ultimately resolve.

